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
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9 JUNE 1987



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VOLKSUNIE'S GABRIELS ON PARTY'S ROLE, PROGRAM, FUTURE

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 15 Apr 87 pp 18-20

[Article and interview with Volksunie chairman Jaak Gabriels, by Peter Renard: "A Party in Search of Youth"]

[Text] The Volksunie [VU] held a spring festival last Sunday in Brussels. Chairman Gabriels made an appeal there to young people and pleaded for a seemly approach to power.

Jaak Gabriels has been chairman of the Volksunie since last December, the fourth chairman of the number four party in Flanders, the party that received a half a million votes in the last parliamentary elections in October 1985. The result of that election was 16 Chamber seats and 12 Senate seats. This outcome was more than 100,000 votes less than in the preceding elections in 1981, when the party seemed to be recovering from the electoral slap-in-the-face resulting from being a coalition partner and from the Egmont Pact, for which the VU had in 1978 received its harshest setback from the voters.

But the success of 1981 was short-lived. In 1982, many local VU branches turned out to be ready and willing to join in municipal government coalitions without obtaining a number of guarantees. The non-conformist party's image suffered from this. "The Volksunie in Flanders has become a party just like any other, one that fails to excite any committed young people," chairman Gabriels says. Its political staff is also urgently in need of rejuvenation, but that is not so easy, since turnover has remained limited over the years. In general, the VU is known, both externally and internally, as the party that claims most strongly to defend the interests of Flanders within Belgium, even though other parties have adopted a large part of that regionalist ideology.

Yet despite the almost continual presence of regional issues on the political scene, the VU has been unable in recent years to score notable successes. Even during the first six months of Gabriels' term as chairman, there is scarcely any evidence of a "Gabriels effect." According to the most recent Dimarso opinion poll, the VU is, after a slight improvement, merely back to the level of the 1985 elections.

The voter also expects from the VU more than the traditional complaints about Jose Happart, the Pecq-Armentieres highway, the unfair transfer of billions of

francs to Wallonia or the lag in Flemish education and scientific research. Viewed against the background of the years of mass unemployment, the Happart affair seems to many to be a matter showing Belgium in its best light.

Vic Anciaux had to close the VU's ranks after the Egmont Pact. In Antwerp in particular, many traditional nationalists, for years frustrated with the so-called progressive course of the VU, had seized upon the Egmont Pact as a reason to leave the party. The Flemish Bloc is now 10 years old, and in that period it has, as Guido Fonteyn wrote in DE STANDAARD, "...evolved from a nationalistic to an extremely rightist party with a violent guest-workers program."

Although Anciaux did succeed in holding the party together, the Volksunie has been suffering from immobility for years. The party has regularly come up with innovative ideas, but has then neglected to put those ideas into practice, or at least to simply defend them. In order to avoid provoking serious debate, the promulgation of its platform has remained limited to its Flemish nationalist elements in the narrowest sense. Party positions in the areas of area planning, environment, socio-economic problems, education and pluralism have not been promulgated by officeholders everywhere in the same manner. The VU in one municipality is thus very different from the VU in another one, a situation that is disastrous for a platform party, as the VU likes to call itself.

After a 10-year transitional period, Jaak Gabriels and the other revitalized party leaders must give the party new momentum and boost its image. Where 10 years ago the party ran aground on participation in a government coalition, and thus on agreeing to compromises with other parties, the new chairman has now in fact advocated once again participation in a coalition, even if only within the Flemish government. In the very first Flemish government, in which all the parties were involved, the VU and the SP were quickly shoved aside when the CVP and the PVV made the Flemish cabinet a branch of the national coalition.

Solidarity

At the same time, the VU wants to again set itself up as the defender of a new political culture, of "seemliness," as Jaak Gabriels likes to call it. In other words, no more political appointments, and the restoration of popular faith in politics and the political structures, which must be further regionalized. Officeholders who do not comply with this will bear the consequences, Gabriels says.

These officeholders must also promulgate the other, non-regional positions. In recent months, the VU has not only dealt with traffic on the highway system; the party has also unconditionally supported the striking Limburg miners. Other notable positions have concerned the refugee problem and the legalization of abortion, and at the spring festival Senator and Secretary-General Paul van Grembergen supported the struggle for political rights by black South Africans, something that Flemish nationalists will have difficulty accepting, due to "genealogical affinity" with the whites.

Whether this will win young people back to the fold is another question. But Jaak Gabriels is also using other means to convince them. For months, the chairman has been making the rounds to universities and to Catholic youth organizations, which previously constituted an important part of the VU electorate and that now show scarcely any interest in the Flemish movement of Ijzerbedevaart or Zangfeest [traditional annual Flemish festivals]. The VU is experiencing obstacles from that movement anyway. Thus its intense efforts to adapt the party profile.

Gabriels: We must not only zealously support a Flemish state, we must also stipulate what form this Flemish state is going to have. I am not one of those who maintain that anything that Flemings do on their own is automatically better. We must take care not to transplant Belgian ailments to Flanders. Our pursuit of a new political culture means an attempt to restore the credibility of politics. We are first of all making an appeal to all people involved in politics to put an end to political appointments. We have introduced a bill to that effect. We cannot continue to have a situation in which officials and magistrates are the vassals of the executive branch. We have drawn up a code of conduct for our own officeholders that is a directive policy for the values that the VU defends. I have not waited around to intervene in individual local parties, not all of them. This has already taken place in Mechelen, and in Bruges, and others, such as Beringen, will soon follow.

Ultimately, we must arrive at a distinct state structure, with clear political structures and an efficient means of operation. At present, the government is no longer making decisions; decision-making power is even more limited, in the hands of the core cabinet or of a few top ministers. How far away are we from an authoritarian state, when a few lobbies make decisions behind closed doors, without the consent of parliament? I recently learned through a parliamentary question, purely by chance, that there have been 13 serious accidents at our nuclear power plants since 1982. No one knew about that.

KNACK: The VU is weak in socio-economic programs.

Gabriels: During the conference on labor, we did pioneering work. But what happened to that afterwards? Who still remembers that the idea of participation, repeated last year at the congress in Courtrai, came from the VU? We stand for a free market economy with social corrections that are not marginal, but are instead fundamental.

KNACK: At the spring festival, you said that the social system must be rethought as a keynote of genuine solidarity. What do you mean by that?

Gabriels: We do not want to dismantle social security, but we do want to work on it. Under the present system, the truly needy are still left out. These are the people drawing from the OCMW [Public Center for Social Welfare], the long-term unemployed. We want to give them new opportunities. At present, a person who has been unemployed for a long period is no longer able to escape his bad situation. Once he has reached a certain age, he also receives a tiny retirement provision. He is confronted with long-term unemployment, or the consequences thereof, until his dying day.

KNACK: Who then will be left out, where will the money come from?

Gabriels: There must be a regrouping of resources. Government welfare benefits must not go out to people who are already doing well and are doing better thanks to the these benefits. A person with net earnings of 40 to 50,000 francs does not need welfare benefits. Social security should, for example, allow the sick to keep up. For people with long-term illnesses, the situation has become intolerable because of the increases in costs.

Limburg

KNACK: Would the VU not pursue a similar economic recovery policy? What does the VU want to do if it governs?

Gabriels: First of all, we want to eliminate the unprecedented transfers of money from Flanders to Wallonia. The existing federalism of consumption must come to an end.

Secondly, we want to work on the holy cows of the compartmentalization of social strata. The partitions of social security themselves take in part of the money that is intended for those who really need it. It annoys me to no end that the trade unions are currently drawing two billion francs for payment of unemployment compensation, while that money is paid out by way of the post office or banks. The municipality supervises, the RVA [National Agency for Labor Provisions] has the files, but the trade unions go to the payment office for customer relations. Even Guy Verhofstadt dares not tinker with this, because since the liberals have been in the government, since 1981, the liberal trade union has gotten more money.

Why do we have differentiated health benefits? Why can't there be a RIZIV [National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance] office in every community? This would in all respects make it impossible for the insurance companies to profit from delayed payment of benefits and from an increase in interest in order to build vacation houses abroad, for the sake of customer relations.

KNACK: But the VU is not in principle against the privatization of government services.

Gabriels: We are not against that, but it must be limited to a number of services. Public transportation simply cannot be privatized. There, the supply is much too small, or the price is much too high. We are willing to accept that which can be privatized, but the public services must first be given the chance to demonstrate their qualities, which has not been the case recently.

KNACK: How do you view the evolution of state reform? You want to talk to the Walloons.

Gabriels: State reform is at an impasse. In view of the fact that we, although we sometimes hold demonstrations, are not a revolutionary people, we

must confer, but this time with sufficient organization. We must, as the Deliberating Center of Flemish Organizations says, specify what we ourselves want to do in the regions, and what we think on a national scale. For Wallonia as well, it is of long-term benefit that we move away from the current federalism of consumption, from the transfers from Flanders. The gross regional product in Flanders is 16 percent higher than in Wallonia. The solidarity fund gives us too little on a yearly basis as well. We should not weigh everything out on a simple scale, the automatic system of unequal distribution cannot be maintained.

KNACK: You do use the simple scale for the Limburg mines, which you always compare to Cockerill-Sambre.

Gabriels: I have already said that the situation is not a fully balanced one. Up until 1979, there was a difference of only five billion francs being pumped into Walloon mines compared to Flemish mines. After that point, Flanders came out nearly 150 billion short. A comparison with Cockerill-Sambre is not possible, since what is involved is fundamental discrimination, while Flanders accounts for 60 percent of the GNP and for three-quarters of foreign trade.

Another point is that the KS file has been moldering for 20 years now. In 1966-67, after the closing of Zwartberg, a promise was made that the coal industry would be restructured over the course of 30 years. Nothing has come of that. The West Germans have linked future-oriented companies to the coal sector, with new technologies. The added value of this compensates for the loss in coal earnings.

KNACK: Is it still possible today to do what should have been done 20 years ago?

Gabriels: In Limburg, we must buy time in order to give people the opportunity to move from the mines into other types of work, instead of into desperation. Limburg is a total disaster area, and is unable to deal with the closing. Because whatever the contention of Thyl Gheyselinck, this is a plan for closing. If you are saying now that 18,000 employees and six million tons of production are strategically worthless, then that will still be the case tomorrow for three million tons of production and 9,000 workers.

KNACK: There is a Flemish government, a Flemish parliament--that may soon be elected separately--and there are Flemish institutions. Nevertheless, the Belgian ailments remain.

Gabriels: The Flemish government is now a reflection of the national one. The Flemish officials have already protested the fact that for every seven officials in the Flemish administration there is only one cabinet member. This is untenable. This is one of the reasons that the VU must get back into the Flemish government, because otherwise we will merely constitute a copy of Belgian institutions.

KNACK: Will use not be made of a new ratio of distribution, instead of making drastic changes in the system of appointments?

Gabriels: We must make a full effort on this. It is here that the political credibility of the VU will be on the line. In recent years, the VU has been too much a reflection of the traditional parties. I am about to introduce a bill for independent appointments and promotions in the magistracy, on proposals by the magistrates. With the civil service, the Standing Recruitment Secretariat can also guarantee promotions. And the political parties must be also forced to use this pool of independent officials for the cabinets.

Abortion

KNACK: The VU wants to place greater emphasis on ecology. It is in this sense that the "Water is Valuable" campaign was begun. Is there a regionalist slant to the VU ecology issue?

Gabriels: No, the VU was working on this issue long before the Walloons effectively tried to tax our water. Actually we have nothing in principle against such a tax. It is merely inconceivable that it could happen in this country, where the Flemings have been doling out presents for years. Through our campaign, we want to work from the local to the national level on an inventory of and change in policy.

KNACK: The Volksunie has opposed the Lallemand-Michielsen bill for freer termination of pregnancy within the first 15 weeks.

Gabriels: That goes too far. That is abortion on demand. Naturally there are good elements in it, but it opens the door to full legalization. The hardest thing is to describe the term "emergency situation." We must preserve the worthiness of protecting life.

KNACK: Fifteen years ago, the VU left its members of parliament free to vote on abortion according to their conscience, for the sake of pluralism. That is no longer the case today.

Gabriels: I would rather not see this problem being treated as a political one, but it is. After long debate within the party, we arrived at this position. Debate now is limited to the concept of an emergency situation. We want that defined more closely. But for us it remains a criminal act.

KNACK: And yet, this remains an ambiguous position, since the court can rule later whether or not the abortion was undertaken in an emergency situation. Is it not better to leave that up to doctors?

Gabriels: That is difficult to assess beforehand. It is also important to us that it be settled in a judicial atmosphere.

KNACK: VU member of parliament Schiltz insinuated in a column in this publication that attitudes towards abortion are prompted by "fear of supposed losses of votes."

Gabriels: That is not true. Perhaps I have a different opinion on that than do others in the party, but once a position has been established on such a fundamental question, everyone should defend it.

KNACK: The members of parliament will thus vote against the Lallemand bill?

Gabriels: That is correct.

KNACK: With regard to political refugees, you agree with the position of Minister of Justice Gol.

Gabriels: We were not in full agreement, but we do consider it a step in the right direction. Most of all, we want a clear distinction drawn between economic and political refugees. If someone is actually a political refugee, then we want to receive him with open arms. But until that has been determined, we want to keep those people together, in part to keep them from later becoming disillusioned. Economic refugees must be helped by way of development aid, of which we have been saying for some time that there is not enough. But it is wrong to ascribe to us xenophobic tendencies because of this position. Nor have we come under pressure from fringe groups.

KNACK: According to a study by the sociology department at the University of Louvain the VU in the 1985 parliamentary elections lost 45 to 52,000 votes to the CVP, 35 to 40,000 to the SP, 24 to 28,000 to AGALEV and only 7 to 8,000 to the Flemish Bloc. Are you not devoting a little too much attention to the extreme right wing?

Gabriels: We are not paying any attention to the Flemish Bloc. We do not want to operate desperately on the fringes, with one foot in the past and one foot in the present, without desiring to move forward. Young Flemings must grow up without complexes, just like young Danes or Norwegians. Nothing more.

12271

CSO: 3614/71

POLL FINDS INCREASE IN FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD USSR

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Apr 87 p 9

[Article: "Gallup Poll: Gorbachev Improving Soviet Union's Standing"]

[Text] It has been said that Soviet Party Boss Gorbachev has aimed at influencing world opinion to a particular degree with the new style. If this is correct, then it can be stated that he has succeeded to no small degree.

As compared with the period under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union's international prestige has grown strongly in comparison with the USA's.

This is according to a poll conducted by the Gallup Institute. It was first in 1982 that the Gallup Institute, in cooperation with the world's remaining Gallup institutes, conducted a worldwide poll in order to shed light on, among other things, people's views of the two superpowers.

Some of these questions have now been repeated in order to shed light on whether the attitude toward the Soviet Union has changed in the intervening period, which has been marked especially by the present party boss.

A representative section of the adult Danish population comprising about 1000 respondents was first asked the following question:

"What is your most general impression of the United States, the USA? Do you have a very positive impression of the USA in general, a somewhat positive impression, a somewhat negative impression, or a very negative impression?"

	1982	1987
USA	%	%
Positive	47	54
Negative	38	31
Do not know	15	15
Total	100	100

The same questions were asked regarding the Soviet Union, and the following answers were given:

	1982	1987
Soviet Union	%	%
Positive	10	37
Negative	74	44
Do not know	16	19
Total	100	100

As can be seen, both superpowers have increased their international prestige. But the Soviet Union comparatively far more than the USA. The positive impression of the USA has increased from 47 to 54 percent, while the Soviet Union has almost quadrupled its positive impression, from 10 to 37 percent. A quite extraordinarily big change in attitude towards the Soviet Union, which almost puts the two superpowers, if not on the same level, then in a situation where there is not an immense difference, and where it is really a question of a public opinion contest.

The following question was asked in order to shed light on the USA's ability to handle world politics:

"In general, how great confidence do you have in the USA's intelligence to handle world politics problems? Do you have great confidence, some confidence, not great confidence, or no confidence?"

	1982	1987
USA	%	%
Some or great confidence	37	37
Little or no confidence	49	48
Do not know	14	15
Total	100	100

As can be seen, confidence in the USA's world politics leadership is unchanged notwithstanding events like the bombing in Libya and the Iran scandal. On the other hand, it must be noted that a relative minority (37 percent versus 48 percent) has some or great confidence in the USA's world politics leadership. The following question was asked with regard to the Soviet Union in particular:

"How probable do you think it is that Soviet Russia will attack West Europe within the next five years? Is it very probable, somewhat probable, not very probable, or not at all probable?"

And the following answers were given:

	1982	1987
	%	%
Very or somewhat probable	16	3
Not very or not at all probable	66	84

Do not know	18	13
Total	100	100

Gorbachev's leadership of the Reykjavik meeting, as well as later initiatives with regard to arms reduction efforts and reduction of nuclear missiles, have clearly influenced opinion in a direction favorable for the Soviet Union. True, in 1982 two thirds of the people (66 percent) were convinced that it was not probable that the Soviet Union would attack West Europe. But today it can be said that practically speaking no one believes in a Soviet attack on West Europe.

All in all, it can be concluded that the Soviet Union has increased its international prestige in a quite decisive manner and on more than one front since the Brezhnev period. Whether this is due to Gorbachev cannot be known. But in consideration of the short periods in office Chernenko and Andropov got an opportunity to act in, it is natural to give Gorbachev no small share of the credit for the result achieved.

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8831

CS0: 3613/64

GREENLAND MINISTRY POSTPONES PLAN TO SHUT DOWN IN 1988

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Apr 87 p 8

[Article by Trine Munk-Petersen: "Doomed Ministry Gets One More Year"]

[Text] The election in Greenland has held up the transfer of the health sector, so the Ministry for Greenland can be finally phased out first on 1 January 1989. This will give time to secure the staff new jobs.

The Ministry for Greenland is nevertheless not being abolished at the expiration of 1988, as was the plan up to now. The phasing out of the ministry's areas of responsibility has dragged on, first and foremost as far as the health sector is concerned, so the final concluding date has been postponed to 1 January 1989.

"There are two reasons," says Minister for Greenland Tom Hoyem. "Out of consideration for the staff, it will really not be possible to finish transferring the health sector within the time limit we have had up to now. And in addition there is the fact that the election in Greenland has now made it completely impossible to stick to the schedule. First and foremost because the Landsting [Greenland parliament] has lost a spring session, which the business was to have been through before we can pass it in our fall session."

The extended time limit has several advantages for the Ministry for Greenland's staff, the minister emphasizes. In part, it will make possible a less hectic phasing-out plan, but it will especially relieve the staff of the uncertainty concerning their future which has troubled many the last few months.

"Now we have a definite date and time enough for 99 percent of the ministry's 170 employees to be able to secure a job ahead of time," Tom Hoyem says.

8831

CSO: 3613/64

GREECE

POLITICAL

U.S. SAID CONCERNED ABOUT SETTLED SPY TRIALS

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 29 Apr 87 p 19

/Editorial: "Bokhanology"/

/Text/ ...And suddenly last Sunday I VRADYNI unearthed the "Bokhan case," saying that the United States (specifically Armacost) had made a demarche to our ambassador in Washington Papoulias over "the activity in Greece of agents and spies acting on behalf of the Soviet Union!" The government denied that any such action was made and I VRADYNI came back talking about "a charge that was made verbally."

What is actually the truth? Under Secretary Armacost did not make the demarche. He saw Papoulias a few days ago and, among other things, he talked to him about Bokhan. About what?

The Americans are troubled about the fact that Serepisios has been exonerated, while Pipitsoulis and Megolokonomos have not yet gone on trial! So, they proclaim that the data given to KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ director Politis and to the officer who had accompanied him to the United States at the time was sufficient to have the above-mentioned individuals sentenced!!! (It is assumed that within the context of cooperation among allies Greece should have made greater efforts to put them in jail). And every now and then the United States comes back to the subject, especially when it suits it.

The Greek Government answers that justice is an independent entity and consequently it cannot intervene in its decisions. As for Serepisios, a trial was held and he was found not guilty. As for the two others, a decision will be rendered.

Consequently, so that we will not be confused by such things we could ask directly whether our good allies are pressuring the Greek Government to intervene in the justice system. We could, you might say, but we should not expect an answer.

I VRADYNI knew something and said--among other things--that "after the exonerating proposal by the public prosecutor it is being surmised that the criminal judges council will also render a not guilty decision, with the result that the case will not reach the courts!" So, let us anticipate the bad, eh?

5671

CSO: 3521/121

REASONS LISTED FOR 'FREEZE' IN RELATIONS WITH U.S.

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 8 May 87 p 3

/Editorial: "Why Greek-American Relations Have Become 'Frozen'"

/Excerpt Behind-the-scenes Greek American relations appear to have become complicated once again. For various and sundry reasons pending issues have not yet been settled despite the many flirtings and small amorous spats that had developed and despite promises by both parties to maintain calm on the waters. What has happened? Everything revolves (is built) around the bases issue that has (generally-speaking) become "frozen."

1. The Greek mission to the United States for work level discussions has been postponed.
2. The signing of the Voice of America agreement has also been postponed.
3. Keeley has not presented his famous "paper" on the "preliminary procedures" on the bases issue.
4. As for Andreas, he is dragging out the situation, showing the Americans that in no case whatsoever does he intend to play his own "cards" early in the game where the bases issue is most important.

However, these are not the only matters. There is also the fact that the Greek Government is waiting at this time to see Turkey's attitude vis-a-vis Greece before beginning the game with the United States. This is so because Andreas does not forget that the Reagan administration is not, of course, an uninterested party in the game of Turkish hooliganism in the Aegean. Within this context the visit to our country of the American diplomat Mark Lissfelt this week is not without significance.

He is a service factor, the "eye" of the beautiful Rozan Ridgeway on issues of southern Europe in the State Department, and he came to Athens exactly to make a survey of the overall situation. And it is not, of course, fortuitous, that he also visited the U.S. bases in Attiki and Crete and that he will go to Ankara and Nicosia immediately after his Greek "tour."

From what is being said, the Americans want to have a picture of Greek-American relations (following the recent Greek-Turkish crisis) prior to broaching the issue of the "preliminary procedures" of the Papoulias-Keeley talks on the bases issue.

It should be noted at this point that once last month the two of them talked about the bases but they did not get to the "preliminary procedures" in the talks, leaving this matter for later.

Moreover, Andreas wants to clear up (a) the matter of the ambassador. Is it a case of a change? The Americans say no. And (b) the matter of the negotiator. On what level will he be and (if this is possible) who will it be?

For its side, the United States is not opposed to a "freezing" of the game.

It feels that if, even it should be for only a short period of time, relations between Greece and Turkey would normalize, through any kind of "dialogue," there would be a benefit and Washington would be able at the same time, through such a development, to work on the bases issue with Greece in a better atmosphere.

This, however, does not mean that Washington has backtracked on the bases issue: Every now and then the United States informs Andreas, through a multitude of "channels," that if he wants matters with the superpower to be in good order he should not get it into his head that he could refuse "giving" the bases to the Americans. Moreover, well-known militant Greek-American congressmen are stressing to Andreas that if he wants to make it easier for them to get Congress to assume positions and attitudes favorable toward Greece and also to promote the Greek-Turkish issue better, then there should be a given fact that the Greek Government will in no case whatsoever ever say "no" to a new bases agreement!

The same circles also warn Andreas every now and then that he could insult the Reagan administration as much as he wants in his statements but he must be careful not to anger Congress from where all the "sensitive" legislation that has to do with military aid to us, with the 7 to 10 ration, etc., comes.

So, while things show that they are in a temporary "freeze" but since the situation is anything but settled since Greek-Turkish relations have not improved and since Andreas is going through such a wild scramble in domestic affairs, nothing can be considered certain for the coming months.

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CSO: 3521/121

GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF DISTRACTING MANEUVERS

Alleged Military Movements

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 7 May 87 p 1

[Excerpt] Mr Papandreou, who realizes that the general outcry of the people is now turning on him personally, is anxiously seeking a kind of distraction capable of diverting the attention of the public from the unending series of scandals being brought to light.

According to exclusive information of I VRADYNI, included in the scenarios "being studied" is the "discovery" of an alleged military movement that is making secret plans against "Change." Their political leadership has in the past few days mobilized "trusted" party officials in the competent services of the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] and security, exploring the possibility of "setting up" some analogous case.

The endeavor is centered primarily among higher military officers (major to colonel) where retirements have recently assumed proportions of a massacre with the result being that there really is some kind of discontent and concern prevalent due to the living problems encountered by retirees. Nevertheless, according to the same information, except for this reasonable discontent, nothing else has been noted in any military rank that would justify even the smallest concern to the state and--even more so--would permit creating a scenario about "an illegal movement."

Mr Papandreou's constant contacts in recent days in Kastri with trusted persons in his entourage, primarily with Mr M. Koutsogiorgas, have been tied to various problem areas and attempts to seek a diversion from the scandals. It is to be noted that Mr Koutsogiorgas is considered the "expert" in inventing and implementing plans for disorienting public opinion or for providing political surprises for opponents.

Government Denial, ND Statement

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 8 May 87 pp 1, 3

/Text/ Yesterday's publication by I VRADYNI about a studied scenario of imaginary "movements" by a group of officers whose goal was to distract and disorient public opinion from the economic scandals has caused obvious commotion in the government.

A statement made by the government spokesman--both surprising and unacceptable in tone and style--did not limit itself to the expected "denial" of I VRADYNI's news but turned into an insulting diatribe.

Broaching the subject, ND, in a statement issued, noted that the government's behavior up to now does not permit it to make proposals nor give advice but that "it is the government's obligation not to create conditions itself that could render such information plausible from the nature of things."

The prime minister also made a personal statement. He avoided any reference to the substance of I VRADYNI's news but limited himself to covering and singing the praises of the new National Intelligence Service's director, namely Mr K. Tsimas, whose "dark background" was noted in the ND communique.

It is also indicative that the government, while resorting to aphorisms and unacceptable descriptions about yesterday's news in I VRADYNI, calling it "irresponsible" and "destabilizing," nevertheless it refused even yesterday to inform public opinion about certain special measures that were taken Wednesday, 6 May, more specifically in the Attiki basin area.

According to our reliable information, on Wednesday (the day before yesterday), the Pelekys plan was suddenly put into effect. This plan calls for all officers and non-commissioned officers serving in units in the Attiki basin area to report at once to their units. Similar measures were also taken by security corps units in the Attiki basin area.

The presence in Athens of certain officers serving in units of northern Greece was also observed. One of these officers was Brigadier General Kasimatis, commander of the 24th Armored Brigade in Litokhori who also happens to be the brother of Mr G. Kasimatis, the prime minister's adviser. Unusual movement was also observed in the GES /Army General Staff/.

According to additional information of ours, orders had been given out that close "surveillance" be put on junta-type individuals both in Athens and Salonica.

Since no government announcement or other responsible information has been given out about these special measures, political observers have asked themselves whether perhaps they had the meaning of a preparation of a repetition of those notorious "nightly mobilizations" by so-called democratic forces on 26-27 February 1983.

The statement put out by Mr G. Roumbatis, the government spokesman, with regard to I VRADYNI's news reads as follows:

"From the day I assumed the duties of government spokesman I stated--and I believe I have kept my word--that for reasons of principle I would not comment on or talk about published reports. I will, however, comment on the accuracy of information contained in published reports.

"The government respects the free interplay of ideas and the right of the press to check and criticize. I would like, nevertheless, to observe--please, do not think that I want to teach my colleagues--that there are limits to scenarios and fantasies.

"I believe that subjects that concern the functioning of democracy itself should be checked much more carefully for accuracy before being published.

"It was with real sadness that I saw I VRADYNI's main column today. I would like to stress that the published report is completely irresponsible. It is destabilizing for the political life of the country. The government finds it unacceptable that such fantasies be mobilized simply and solely for opposition reasons."

In answer to the government's reaction, ND issued the following communique:

"The tone in the government's reaction to a published report today according to which the government is preparing some sort of 'distraction' having the armed forces as an objective and the description of the published report as 'destabilizing' constitute examples of excessive nervousness that is not justified by events.

"It is altogether certain that the government has placed the national security services in the service of the party, indeed, in a provocative manner. After the dismissal (for unexplained reasons) of well-known Brigadier General Makedos from the position of EYP /National Intelligence Service/ director and his replacement by a civilian, namely Mr Tsimas, whose only qualification is some dark background for activities outside the country and his service in unconventional fields.

"It is also known that the government had for years devoted itself to "confronting" imaginary dangers through nighttime mobilizations.

"Consequently, the government's claim that the accuracy of such information should be 'checked' more carefully before being published is quite funny. In order to safeguard democracy it is the duty of the press to publish such information whenever it gets its hands on it. It is also the duty of the government not to create conditions that might make such forms of information plausible."

The prime minister's statement on Mr Tsimas reads as follows:

"The attempt by ND's leadership to blacken the honor and background of the new EYP director is odd. Kostas Tsimas, with indisputable abilities and irreproachable character, through tough fights for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the colonels, is distinguished for his faith and devotion to democracy and to our parliamentary form of government. He is pledged to fight for the safeguarding of our national interests."

Moreover, the government spokesman made the following comments with regard to the ND communique:

"The indirect acceptance by ND's leadership of today's inadmissible published report reveals irresponsibility at the least."

An evening communique put out by ND's press office answered the prime minister by saying that only he knows Mr Tsimas' qualifications while the rest of the Greek people do not know about them, such as the "tough fights" in PAK's /Panhellenic Liberation Movement/ dark crusaders.

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COMMENTS ON EYP LEADERSHIP

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 8 May 87 p 15

/Excerpt/ The assignment of K. Tsimas to the EYP /National Intelligence Service/ will have some significance if it is not a mere "changing of the guard" (Tsimas instead of Makedos) but something more substantial: if, indeed, it confirms the government's decision to definitely move forward in demilitarizing this service.

Tsimas, having been in the resistance movement during the dictatorship years as a PAK /Panhellenic Liberation Movement/ cadre, is on friendly terms with Andreas Papandreou and it seems that he has received specific instructions.

Those working in EYP feel that the reason for this is to shatter the service's foundations that have remained intact all of these years even after its being renamed last year. They also believe that the first step could take place with the drafting of a rationalistic organization chart that would be drafted with the participation of the employees themselves.

The employees' disputes with Makedos and EYP's "output" during the recent crisis were the prime reasons why the former head of the one time KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ was "destroyed." Will we remain at this point or will we have a real change?

There is also, of course, the well-known scenario that PONDIKI was the first to reveal a few months ago, namely that Makedos is gradually being promoted in the Air Force leadership so as to fill the void that Kouris will leave when he departs to become deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of the bases negotiations.

A little bit of patience, everything will be cleared up, at least as far as the number two is concerned. But what is really of interest is another matter: to really separate the EYP from the KYP. Will Tsimas succeed in this?

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BILDT BIG LOSER IN POLL ON PARTY LEADERS' POPULARITY

Westerberg Increases Position

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Mar 87 p 6

[Article by Dick Ljungberg]

[Text] The voters are adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward the new Center Party leader, Olof Johansson, but still have little confidence in the new Conservative Party leader, Carl Bildt. Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg are playing in a division of their own.

This is shown by the new DAGENS NYHETER-IMU [Institute for Market Research] poll on confidence in the party leaders, in which 925 people were interviewed during the period from 9 February to 11 March.

The first confidence poll was published just before Christmas. Among other events since then, Karin Soder has resigned as Center Party leader and the government submitted a budget, which it followed immediately with a general price freeze. The Social Democrats and the Liberal Party also reached an agreement on defense, leading Carl Bildt to attack Bengt Westerberg. The two men have also quarreled about taxes. Ingvar Carlsson has been under pressure because of both the fuss surrounding the Palme investigation and the rumpus over arms smuggling.

Bildt Last

But even so, there have been no major changes in the popularity ratings. The lineup is the same as it was in December and looks like this, with the previous figures shown in parentheses:

1. Ingvar Carlsson enjoys the confidence of 72 percent (70 percent) and inspires distrust among 24 percent.
2. Bengt Westerberg has the confidence of 50 percent (52 percent) of the voters and is distrusted by 45 percent.

3. Olof Johansson, in his first showing, has the confidence of 29 percent, while 57 percent distrust him. In her last poll, Karin Soder had the confidence of 36 percent.

4. Lars Werner, leader of the VPK [Left Party-Communists], has the confidence of 26 percent (no change), while 69 percent feel distrust.

5. Carl Bildt is in last place again with 25 percent saying they have confidence in him (no change), while 67 percent say they distrust him.

It can be added that the number of voters saying they "don't know" about Olof Johansson at this early stage is unusually high at 13 percent. On the other hand, the number of voters uncertain about Carl Bildt is now down to normal levels.

Strong in Center Party

Olof Johansson therefore enjoys less confidence overall than Karin Soder did, but it turns out that his position within the Center Party is at least equally strong.

Ingvar Carlsson and Bengt Westerberg each enjoy the confidence of 88 percent of their own party sympathizers. But Lars Werner heads the league, since he enjoys the confidence of 92 percent of the VPK's voters. In the Center Party, 72 percent are betting on Olof Johansson, compared to 67 percent for Karin Soder in December. And Carl Bildt is also popular with 72 percent of the voters in his own party.

Among socialist sympathizers, 40 percent have confidence in Bengt Westerberg, 22 percent have confidence in Olof Johansson--compared to 30 percent for Karin Soder--and 8 percent have confidence in Carl Bildt. Among nonsocialists, 65 percent have confidence in Bengt Westerberg--a slight drop--while 46 percent have confidence in Bildt and 39 percent have confidence in Olof Johansson, compared to 44 percent for Karin Soder.

Prime Minister

Ingvar Carlsson enjoys the confidence of 59 percent of nonsocialist sympathizers. The highest figure is found in the Liberal Party (71 percent), followed by the Center Party (63 percent) and the Conservative Party (46 percent). Confidence in Carlsson has risen markedly among middle party voters.

Bengt Westerberg has somewhat strengthened his position as a nonsocialist candidate for prime minister, according to the IMU's special question on that point.


In all, 56 percent designated Westerberg as their choice for nonsocialist candidate for prime minister, compared to 54 percent in December. Olof Johansson was mentioned by 20 percent, compared to 19 percent for Karin Soder, and Carl Bildt wound up with 11 percent (12 percent in December).

Among Liberal Party voters, 91 percent feel that Bengt Westerberg is the right candidate, compared to 86 percent in December. And 48 percent of the Center Party's voters are betting on Olof Johansson. In the December poll, Karin Soder was the choice of only 34 percent, meaning that the Center Party's voters wanted Westerberg rather than Karin Soder as prime minister. Westerberg is now the choice of 33 percent of the Center Party's voters and 29 percent of the Conservative Party's voters.

Among socialist voters, 61 percent choose Westerberg as their candidate for prime minister, while 23 percent choose Olof Johansson and 4 percent choose Carl Bildt. Among nonsocialist voters, 52 percent choose Bengt Westerberg, 18 percent pick Carl Bildt, and 17 percent choose Olof Johansson.

On that question, Olof Johansson's position is somewhat stronger than Karin Soder's among nonsocialists but weaker among socialist sympathizers.

Hit Parade of Party Leaders
(percentage of all respondents expressing confidence)



Confidence Poll

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Nonsocialist</u>	<u>Socialist</u>
Number of interviews	925	bloc 412	bloc 415

"How great is your confidence in each of the party leaders?"

<u>Carl Bildt</u>	3%	7%	0%
Very great confidence	22	39	8
Great confidence	45	40	49
Not very great confidence	22	7	37
No confidence at all	7	6	7
Don't know			
<u>Ingvar Carlsson</u>			
Very great confidence	19	7	34
Great confidence	53	52	53
Not very great confidence	20	31	10
No confidence at all	4	5	1
Don't know	4	5	2
<u>Olof Johansson</u>			
Very great confidence	3	5	1
Great confidence	26	34	21
Not very great confidence	46	41	51
No confidence at all	11	8	14
Don't know	13	13	13
<u>Lars Werner</u>			
Very great confidence	3	1	6
Great confidence	23	11	35
Not very great confidence	43	43	41
No confidence at all	26	40	13
Don't know	6	6	5
<u>Bengt Westerberg</u>			
Very great confidence	8	15	3
Great confidence	42	50	37
Not very great confidence	37	26	44
No confidence at all	8	5	11
Don't know	5	4	5

"Let us imagine a nonsocialist victory in the next election. Which of the following would you prefer to see as prime minister?"

Carl Bildt	11	18	4
Bengt Westerberg	56	52	61
Olof Johansson	20	17	23
It doesn't matter	4	5	3
None of them	5	3	6
Don't know	5	6	3

Center, Liberals Distrust Conservatives

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Mar 87 p 6

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Carl Bildt the Winter's Loser"]

[Text] The past half year has not been especially cheery for Carl Bildt. The Conservative Party has been dropping in the voter barometers during his time as party leader, and Bengt Westerberg has dethroned him as opposition leader.

The reason for the low confidence figures is probably that Carl Bildt--so far at least--does not enjoy any really solid support even within his own party. Whereas Ingvar Carlsson and Bengt Westerberg have the approval of 88 percent of their own voters, only 62 percent of the Conservatives support Carl Bildt.

The explanation may be that the eternally young Carl Bildt is adopting attitudes that one needs to be very young or very old to get away with under the glare of TV lights. Cheekiness and constant naysaying do not befit a Carl Bildt who is entering middle age.

The climate in society has changed since Olof Palme's assassination, and there is not a favorable market for so-called bickering. Carl Bildt is therefore suffering as a result of the pie-throwing to which his predecessors Gosta Bohman and Ulf Adelsohn devoted themselves but which he himself participated in in the area of security policy.

Olof Palme was the Conservative Party's special hate object and chief standby when mobilization was needed, but now there are only the nice and decent Ingvar Carlsson, dexterous Minister of Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson, and that favorite of the businessmen, Kjell-Olof Feldt.

The Conservatives have lost their political sounding board.

The Conservatives were long able to claim that they were the most credible nonsocialist party. The then Agrarian Party had engaged in horse trading with the Social Democrats, and in the single-chamber Parliament, the Liberal Party had tried its hand at being the swing party and a political engineer.

Now the situation has changed. The Conservative Party helped wreck two nonsocialist governments. Gosta Bohman could not conceal his aversion to Ola Ullsten, and Ulf Adelsohn's call for a "change of system" during the 1985 election campaign was the final nail in the coffin. For the Conservatives, it was more important that they themselves should win than that they should bring about a change in government.

Those changes in the past and the low confidence figures for Carl Bildt mean that the Conservative Party has lost its preferential position as the interpreter of what should be considered good nonsocialist policy.

The attempts by Carl Bildt to put Bengt Westerberg in his place on the issues of defense and taxes were a failure.

Carl Bildt is still in last place in the confidence poll, behind Olof Johansson and Lars Werner, while Bengt Westerberg has advanced a little further as the nonsocialist bloc's number one candidate for prime minister.

There is no doubt that last Wednesday's duel of party leaders between Ingvar Carlsson and Bengt Westerberg further strengthened the Liberal Party leader's position in nonsocialist voter opinion. Westerberg's will to bring about a change of government in the next election cannot be questioned, considering the way Ingvar Carlsson set up that debate.

So it is now the Conservatives more than the Liberal Party who are facing an important political crossroads.

There are four issues on which the Conservatives have rebelled against what can be regarded as an otherwise united nonsocialist front in the runup to the next election.

Those issues are defense during the 5-year period from 1987 to 1992, the demand for major tax reductions and cutbacks in public finance, rejection of the elimination of nuclear power by the year 2010, and rejection of the South African boycott.

The Conservatives are worried about their right wing. That is why Carl Bildt is carrying on the way he is. Bildt must make it clear that there is a rightist alternative in Sweden.

Facing the Conservatives in the future is the touchy matter of weighing things out and deciding how far they can go in sharpening their own image without being regarded as something of a saboteur in the next election as far as the nonsocialist bloc is concerned.

The fact that Carl Bildt is in last place in the confidence polls for the third time in a row does not make that decision any easier.

Paper Interprets Poll Results

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Party Leaders With Credibility"]

[Text] All the party leaders are currently sitting firmly in the saddle. That is an important piece of information in particular for Olof Johansson, the new Center Party leader, who is making his first appearance in the IMU's confidence polls.

It is true that Karin Soder scored higher among voters as a whole. But Olof Johansson now has more support from his own voters than Karin Soder had last fall. Having that internal support is an important first condition if a party leader is to be able to act fearlessly toward those on the outside and constructively in his cooperation with others.

The IMU poll also confirms that Ingvar Carlsson and Bengt Westerberg enjoy a historically high level of credibility with the Swedish public. In Carlsson's case, it will most likely climb even higher. And it is not limited just to his own party: 71 percent of the Liberal Party's voters and nearly half of the Conservative Party's voters say they have very great or great confidence in Ingvar Carlsson.

That may shed light on a difference between the picture presented by the media and reality. Carlsson has been presented in the media as being under pressure and slow in responding, chiefly in connection with the South African boycott. But as far as most voters are concerned, that drawback may be seen as a recommendation instead. They prefer a prime minister who resists temporary storms and thinks more of the long-term consequences. To the extent that Ingvar Carlsson eventually yielded despite his real convictions concerning the South African boycott, he probably did so quickly and with a firmness which the majority of voters have particularly appreciated in his earlier actions.

On the nonsocialist side, Bengt Westerberg still occupies a strong position. For every nonsocialist voter naming either Carl Bildt or Olof Johansson as the preferred prime minister, three say they favor Bengt Westerberg. Whereas 91 percent of the Liberal Party's voters want their own party leader to be prime minister, less than half of the Conservative and Center Party voters choose their respective chairmen as the prime minister they would prefer.

This does not necessarily mean that Bildt and Johansson are distrusted by their own voters--only that a majority of nonsocialist voters today consider Bengt Westerberg to be the natural prime minister in a new government. That assessment also exists among Social Democratic voters, 42 percent of whom say they have very great or great confidence in Bengt Westerberg, while 22 percent say the same about Olof Johansson and 8 percent say the same about Carl Bildt.

Considering the stabilization that has occurred both in the internal situation of the parties and in public opinion, it would be good if all the nonsocialist parties could view the widespread confidence in Bengt Westerberg as a shared asset rather than as a threat.

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RELATIONS WITH 6 NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES EXAMINED

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 5-11 Jan 87 pp 18-26

[Cover story: "Turkey and Its Neighbors"]

[Text] [Box p 18] While Prime Minister and the leader of the Republican People's Party, Bulent Ecevit said with regard to Turkish foreign policy:

"We have good relations with all of our neighbors except one: Greece."

At the time these remarks were made, we were proudly able to boast in international forums about our "good-neighborly" relations. In contrast, today Turkey is a country which has problems with all of its neighbors.

There is obviously a large measure of truth in the saying "if two countries share a border they also share problems." But how did we arrive at this situation in as little as 10 years? It is almost as if some strange force set out to refute the statement "we have no problems with any of our neighbors" and brought Turkey to its present situation. The emergence of the present set of problems when there were no significant tensions [10 years ago] is of course not a coincidence.

Moreover, in its problems with neighboring countries Turkey is in the position of a "country from which something is demanded." The problems stem from the neighbors' demands or "aspirations on Turkey."

Although problems of different magnitude exist with our neighbors Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Syria, truly "good" relations have been maintained with countries beyond our neighbors such as Yugoslavia, Albania, Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In a way, Turkey has developed problems with the countries with which a hot war is possible.

What is this circle of problems surrounding Turkey and how did it come about? Problems with Turkey's neighbors multiplied rapidly in the years that followed the statement: "We have no problems with any of our neighbors except one: Greece." [end box]

It is widely accepted that Turkey's geopolitical position in the world has a major effect on its relations with its neighbors. Turkey's geographical location is said to be "evoking emotions of self-interest" in many countries.

The developments in Turkey's foreign relations over a certain period is evidently the result of various causes. Interpretations of this situation paint the following picture:

The War of Liberation was won against nations which represented imperialism. That victory led all oppressed nations to rebel and raised Turkey's reputation among countries known today as the "Third World nations." The representatives of imperialism could not ignore this respectability accorded to the new Turkish state. Moreover, in setting the goals of the new Turkish state, the leader of the War of Liberation, Mustafa Kemal, used the concept of "modern civilization" as a standard and took the "West" as an example to follow. This development in the first quarter of the 20th century made Turkey "the country to the east of the West" for Easterners and "the country to the west of the East" for Westerners. However, the outbreak of World War II, which occurred before the turmoil caused by economic crises was overcome, swept away the balances based on reputation and led to the establishment of relations based on tangible interests. Turkey tried to become "an Islamic country in the West" within the international camps symbolizing this new concept. However, a dominant Turkish status among Islamic countries was seen by Westerners as a "sign of disturbing strength" and raised concerns among the Islamic nations about "the return of Ottoman rule." It is this view that has prompted the West as well as the Islamic countries to take postures designed to show that they are "not bowing to Turkey." As a result, countries which have relations with Turkey have chosen to bring up certain issues whenever they see Turkey's strength as "objectionable for their interests." The most visible among these have been the "separatist" movements.

Attempts have been made to break up Turkey's social unity by exploiting racial and religious differences and corrupting religion and to upset uniformity in education. The purpose of these acts has been to create a Turkey which cannot fill its need for trained manpower, whose population is rapidly growing, whose dynamism in modernization has been impeded by religious and sectarian differences and whose attempts at achieving economic independence have been scuttled.

In addition, a persistent lobbying campaign has been waged to influence the views of Western countries with which Turkey needs to cooperate. Meanwhile, the harsh measures created in Turkey by certain methods and supported by foreign circles prevented the development of the practice of resolving problems through democratic debate and dialog and were used as "anti-Turkish propaganda" in the Western community in which we want to become a member. Greece assumed the responsibility to wage this propaganda in NATO as well as the European Parliament.

In the meantime, in developing its relations with the countries of the region, Turkey tried to keep them at a certain level such that they would not be interpreted by the West as a "disturbing collaboration." However, those who wish to keep Turkey under pressure have made sure that demands against Turkey—including "territorial claims"—remain alive.

Today, Turkey has become an "Eastern" nation for Westerners and a "Western" nation for the countries of the region and in particular the Islamic nations.

In reality, today Turkey has good relations with many Western as well as Islamic countries. However, it is remarkable that it has encountered difficulties in establishing such good relations with its neighbors. Moreover, every time Turkey has tried to improve its relations [with the West] as a "loyal and devoted" member of NATO it has found the heat of the problems around it on the negotiating table.

The links of a chain of various interests which range from defense to economic issues are currently being forged by the hammers and anvils of Greek and Armenian lobbies in the United States.

Today, in trying to enter the EEC Turkey has to overcome the same virulent propaganda waged by the same collaborationist circles. Indeed, every impediment erected before Turkey has been channeled to international forums through these lobbies as part of the strategy of "cutting Turkey's strength." In recent years, PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] has joined this group which is capable of influencing international relations.

In conjunction with the points of friction created with neighboring countries, the tensions caused by Turkey's attempts at democratization have also been used as "unfavorable propaganda" material among the Western countries we want to join. In a way, Turkey is seen as a "problematic" and "lonely" country by both the countries it wants to join and the countries of its own region.

Some have claimed that this situation has been created with the knowledge of the United States in order to force Turkey "to feel the need to get closer to the United States."

But in the final analysis, Turkey has to live as neighbors with the Soviet Union which has not refrained from publicly stating its claims on Turkey in the past; Bulgaria which is waging a campaign of "assimilation" against its Turkish minority; Greece which collaborates with and provides political support to anti-Turkish forces; Iran which is intent on exporting its own system of government and which wants to control religious movements in Turkey; Iraq which is home to Kurds who are awaiting and preparing for the day they can realize their territorial claims; and Syria which has ambitions on certain territories and which supports others who have territorial claims because of its need for water.

In order to stop those who have claims on its territory--even though Turkey has no territorial claims on anyone--Turkey must either be very strong or has to make concessions continually. In a sense, these two options form the frame of Turkey's foreign policy.

It is now essential for Turkey to turn its relations with all countries--in particular its neighbors--into "ties based on indispensable economic interests" which can provide an "escape route" from these problems.

Armaoglu: 'Some Nations Are Afraid of a Stronger Turkey'

Professor Fahir Armaoglu, a foreign policy and political history specialist, replied to YANKI's questions on "Turkey and its neighbors."

[Question] Could you give us a general evaluation of the present state of Turkey's relations with its neighbors?

[Answer] The first thing we can say about our neighbors from a general standpoint is that the "circle of neighbors" surrounding us has a heterogeneous structure. In other words, our neighbors are different from each other in terms of their political systems, economic structures and problems, foreign policy goals and so forth. None of them are like any other. This creates a problem for Turkish foreign policy. Because we have to shape our relations with each of them separately and we must try to accommodate all of them in their conflicts with each other. It is very difficult to pursue a homogeneous and uniform policy with respect to a heterogeneous community.

Another characteristic of our neighbors is that they are "unstable." In some of our neighbors, there were frequent changes of government in the 1950's and even in the 1960's. These changes created problems for us as well. Because instability around you also means insecurity. Stability means security. One may decide on a policy with respect to a fixed and unchanging situation and stay with it. In changing situations you have to formulate a new position for every change. Moreover, you may have to harmonize every new position you take with previous positions.

Of course, "stability" has two sides. There may be positive stability which may be to your advantage, and there may be negative stability which may be to your disadvantage. It would be more accurate to place the present state of stability among our neighbors in this second category. Because, frankly, all of them have their eyes on Turkey. I do not need to say that these stares do not augur well. Each one of our neighbors has its own ambitions on Turkey. In other words, while the circle surrounding us is heterogeneous, their motives with regard to Turkey are homogeneous.

[Question] Do we not have any neighbors with which we have good relations?

[Answer] Of course we do. Let me first say that I do not mean that we have "problems" or "disputes" with all of our neighbors. It is true that we have strong disagreements with some of them. But that is not the case with all of them. From that standpoint, I think that presently the country with which we have the smoothest relations and full mutual understanding is Iraq. Barring any radical changes in Iraq, one may say that the present state of our relations will continue in a stable manner into the future. Of course, we sincerely wish that we can have similar relations with our other neighbors.

[Question] Can you explain the view that our neighbors do not mean well for Turkey and that each one of our neighbors has its own ambitions on Turkey?

[Answer] Without naming specific countries one can say that today Turkey is the target of three principal destructive and separatist movements which

originate from its neighbors. These movements are: procommunist ideological destructiveness and separatism, ethnic separatism and sectarian separatism. The Turkish nation is faced with these three perils today. Naturally, these threats vary in magnitude. But all three are alive today even if in varying degrees. To these perils one may add a fourth, namely Greece. Although Greece does not pose an ideological, ethnic or sectarian threat to Turkey, it is a political and imperialist threat which perhaps exploits all these movements. Turkey must break the arm of Greek imperialism without delay.

[Question] Are radical changes possible in our relations with our neighbors by the beginning of the 21st century?

[Answer] Naturally it is very hard to portray the state of our relations with our neighbors in January 2000 14 years ahead of time. Prophecy is a most difficult task for the human mind. Even so, however, some predictions can be made and I can state my prediction in its general features as follows: The biggest difficulty in Turkey's foreign policy is its determination to become a strong and advanced nation. This may be seen as a contradiction. But the fact is that as Turkey grows stronger, friends and foes have begun to ask: "Is the Ottoman Empire being resurrected?" Some of our neighbors clearly display the symptoms of such a psychosis. That being the case, I do not think that the situation at the beginning of the 2000's will be much different from what it is today. Consequently, there is something that Turkey must do: The more forward-looking a foreign policy is the sounder and the more prepared for threats it will be. Therefore, Turkey must formulate its foreign policy on a very long-term basis. Thus, it is crucial to establish solid footholds beyond the circle of neighbors on a, so to speak, second outlying circle. We must build our foreign policy like an extensive lacework.

Professor Toktamis Ates' Comments

On relations with Greece:

After Turkey emerged victorious from its war of national liberation, it extended its hand of friendship to Greece prepared to forget the incredible brutality and savagery perpetrated by Greece during the war. As a result, a genuine friendship was established between Ataturk and Venizelos after exchanges of the Greek population in Anatolia and the Turkish population in Greece and the clarification of the status of Greeks in Istanbul and Turks in Western Thrace. This friendship lasted until the 1950's, and Turkey acted with trust and good will on every issue concerning Greece. When Italy turned over the Aegean islands to Greece after World War II, Turkey did not object on condition that their demilitarized status was preserved. Similarly, Turkey did not object to the transfer of all flight information regions in the Aegean to Greece. In addition, after committing all its armed forces to NATO Turkey did not find anything uncomfortable about Greek officers sharing its military data. The turning point in Turkey's relations with Greece was the Cyprus incidents of 1964.

We do not fully know what the sentiments of the Greek people are toward the Turkish people and Turkey. We have read and heard much about the fact that the Greek people do not share their governments' hostility toward Turkey.

However, we do not have serious studies and evidence to that effect in our hands. We can say that some of the Greek people who migrated from Turkey to Greece in the 1920's and in the late 1960's have fond memories of Turkey. Otherwise, without such moral support it would be unthinkable for Greek composer Theodorakis to come to Istanbul and criticize Greek foreign policy. On the other hand, Ayia Sophia is still a holy shrine for some conservative and religious Greeks who hope that one day it will be liberated.

"Megalo Idea," that is the dream of reconstituting the ancient eastern Roman Empire with a Greek spirit, is constantly on the agenda of the Greek politicians. As part of that dream, the Aegean Sea is labeled the "Greek Sea," which is what they are trying to achieve by raising their territorial water limits to 12 miles. Even though they have paid a heavy price for their adventure in Cyprus, which they see as part of Greece, they have not refrained from engaging in new ventures whenever the opportunity arises. In doing that, they rely more on the "Greek lobby" in the United States than on themselves.

Remarkably, however, Greece is intimidated by Turkey and Turkey's military might. Turkey's non-NATO Aegean Army in particular is a constant source of anxiety for Greece. The marine divisions and the landing fleets affiliated with this army keep Greece wondering. In reality, Turkey has no ambitions on either Greece or the Aegean islands. However, Greece does not believe this and has engaged in an irrational military spending campaign. While Turkey spends a little more than 3 percent of its GNP on the military (which in itself is a high rate), Greece spends 7 percent of its national income on its military.

Above all, Greek politicians want to use the imagined Turkish threat as material for domestic politics.

On relations with Bulgaria:

At no time in the last quarter of a century have relations with Bulgaria been as warm and as cool and tense as after 1980. In reality, there are no outstanding tangible or objective problems between Turkey and Bulgaria. Three Turkish provinces in the Thrace receive their electricity from Bulgaria; visits are exchanged at the highest level; Bulgaria has stopped requiring visas--which it insisted on for years--from Turkish nationals; and Turkey has offered easements for Bulgarian TIR trucks. Then, all of a sudden, Bulgaria began its "Bulgarization" campaign against ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. One can speculate extensively on why they felt the need for such a move. However, there are no evident reasons for this repression and persecution which has occasionally bordered on genocide. Turkey, which is generally very mindful of not interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors, was in this case forced to take sides. The wounds opened by this "Bulgarization campaign" in the conscience of the Turkish public will not heal easily, and it will take a long time before relations between Turkey and Bulgaria return to their warm and friendly state.

On relations with the Soviet Union:

The principal element that has shaped Turkey's post-World War II foreign policy has been Stalin's view of Turkey and Soviet claims on Turkey. Despite its original intentions of not taking part in any military alliance and pursuing a relatively independent foreign policy, because of the Soviet demands Turkey was forced to enter the U.S. orbit. Although the Soviet Union officially renounced its demands and apologized to Turkey after 1956, Turkey could partly extricate itself from the U.S. orbit only after 1965.

Today, the Soviets have a partly positive and partly uneasy view of Turkey. Having refrained from raising the issue of differences in regime, the Soviets in fact have friendly and warm economic relations with Turkey. However, the Soviet Union does not trust Turkey because of its membership in NATO. In reality, Turkey's insistence on not getting entangled in the problems of the Middle East and its refusal to take a fully obedient posture with respect to the United States--as Egypt has done--have increased Turkey's respectability and importance in Soviet eyes. Even so, however, the Soviet Union cannot be contemplated to have much sympathy toward a NATO nation. Moreover, the Soviets must certainly have a role in Syria's attitude toward Turkey. In addition, it is hard to say that the Soviets do not approve the "Bulgarization" campaign in Bulgaria.

On relations with Iran:

Historically, Turkey has never had good relations with Iran. Under the Shah, Iran secretly supported all types of separatist and divisive movements in Turkey and was constantly concerned about a powerful Turkey. This was partly out of concern that the Azeri Turks, which form a substantial portion of Iran's population, could harbor pro-Turkish sentiments.

Today, the Khomeyni regime is opposed and hostile to Mustafa Kemal's secular republic in principle. Remarkably, Iran has refrained from expressing its hostility at the highest level. Iran cannot be expected to continue its relations with Turkey with such attitudes with Turkish governments which are more sensitive about Ataturk's principles.

On relations with Iraq:

The posture adopted by Turkey after the ouster of the Faisal regime in Iraq overshadowed Ankara's relations with the Iraqi wing of the Ba'ath party for a very long time. However, a common stance against separatist movements and mutually profitable economic relations have partly broken the ice between the two countries. We would not be exaggerating if we said that Turkey has the smoothest dialog with Iraq among its neighbors.

On relations with Syria:

Turkey has had problems with Syria from the day that country was established. The annexation of the Sanjak of Iskenderun (Hatay) has been a theme Syria has persistently harped upon. Whenever something breaks out in Syrian domestic

politics eyes are immediately turned to Turkey. Of course, we must not forget the inferiority complex Syria feels because of centuries of Ottoman domination of that country.

[Box p 25] Since the 1920's Turkey's foreign policy has been based on two principles. One of these is the indisputability of the borders set by the National Pact [of 1920], and the second one is the slogan "Peace at home, peace in the world." Indeed, although Turkey has had governments with very different attitudes since the establishment of the republic, these two principles have never been disputed.

In contrast to this peaceloving attitude by Turkey, we observe that our neighbors sometimes take different postures. This has stemmed from different causes in different countries. However, there are two fundamental causes which can be stated immediately: An inferiority complex and some neighbors' need to calm down their domestic politics by pointing to foreign targets.

Positive, Negative Features of Relations With 6 Neighbors

Soviet Union

Positive Features

--Construction of a natural gas pipeline is under way. Ankara will be heated by Soviet natural gas which will also be used in industry.

--The trade balance is developing in Turkey's favor. Turkey's exports have been growing steadily. Cooperation between the two countries is expanding into new areas.

Negative Features

--Separatist movements receive indirect financial and arms aid from the Soviet Union.

--The Soviets contributed to the emergence of the pre-12 September environment of terror and anarchy.

--The Soviets are diametrically opposed to the Turkish position in Cyprus and have proposed an international conference on the issue.

--Moscow has taken a hardline stance on the utilization of the resources of the Black Sea. Talks on Black Sea economic zones are expected to be very tough.

--The Soviets have not permitted Mustafa Suleymanov who fled from Bulgaria and has taken sanctuary in the Turkish embassy in Moscow to emigrate to Turkey.

--The Soviets support the East Berlin-based Turkish Communist Party and help them to wage anti-Turkish propaganda.

--The Voice of the Turkish Communist Party and Our Radio similarly receive Soviet support in their anti-Turkish broadcasts.

--The Soviets support Armenian organizations which have been attempting to lay claim on Turkish territories on the basis of some concocted documents.

--The Soviets have been trying to suppress the national identities of the Kirghiz, Kazakh, Uzbek and Tartar Turks under their domination.

--The Soviets maintain a very large diplomatic mission in Turkey. At least half the personnel of the embassy are known to be members of the KGB and the GRU.

Soviet Forces on Turkey's Border

--45 SS-20 missiles which can hit any part of Turkey.

--453 warplanes.

--1 tank division, 1 paratrooper division, 28 motorized infantry divisions.

--1 paratrooper brigade, 2 artillery brigades, 1 independent motorized infantry brigade.

--620 helicopters for the paratrooper units.

--Large Black Sea fleet.

Turkish-Soviet Trade (in dollars)

	1984 -----	1985 -----	1986 (first 9 months) -----
Imports	313,061,398	220,727,688	197,755,674
Exports	138,507,891	190,050,255	95,705,036

What we sell: Lemons, raisins, hazelnuts, margarine, mohair wool, tobacco, cotton, corduroy fabric.

What we buy: Raw sunflower oil, diesel fuel, ammonia, urea, assorted machinery and parts.

Bulgaria

Positive Features

--Despite various problems, TIR trucks continue to cross the border in both directions. Turkish TIR trucks carry export goods to Europe through Bulgaria because it is a shorter path.

Negative Features

--Bulgaria has been waging a campaign of threats and repression to Bulgarize the Turks on its territory.

--Turkish vehicles passing through Bulgaria are always fined.

--Bulgaria has refused to come to an agreement over the Rezve Stream which is a source of border dispute between the two countries.

--Turkish fishermen are occasionally seized in international waters in the Black Sea and are taken to Bulgaria to be tried and imprisoned.

--During the pre-12 September period Bulgaria engaged in arms and cigarette smuggling into Turkey through state-owned companies. Now it is trying to continue the cigarette smuggling.

--Bulgarian agents have been coercing Turkish emigrants from Bulgaria to spy against Turkey by threatening to kill their kinsmen in Bulgaria.

--Bulgaria has consistently opposed Turkish positions in international forums and has supported Soviet positions.

Bulgarian Armed Forces

--Manpower: 148,500 men.

--Firepower: 1,950 tanks, 1,400 artillery pieces, 1,000 armored personnel carriers, 150 antitank rockets.

--Air force: 245 warplanes.

--Navy: 3 submarines, 3 corvettes, 2 frigates, 2 guided-missile ships, 13 patrol boats, 33 mine-laying ships, 23 landing craft.

Turkish-Bulgarian Trade (in dollars)

	1984 -----	1985 -----	1986 (first 9 months) -----
Imports	121,124,247	98,752,934	36,973,641
Exports	24,122,651	7,699,524	8,853,763

What we sell: Plastic processing machines, polished plain glass.

What we buy: Raw sunflower seed oil, diesel fuel, steel billets and plates.

Greece

Positive Features

- No intrinsic antagonism exists between the Turkish and Greek peoples; the two peoples have affectionate feelings toward each other.
- The two countries share common features in cuisine, music and culture.
- Greek nationals--who are not subject to Turkish visa requirements--contribute substantially to the Turkish tourism industry.
- Intellectuals of the two countries have initiated cooperation with aim of "friendship".

Negative Features

- Greece has not renounced its dream of "enosis" in Cyprus and has persistently blocked efforts for a resolution of the problem.
- Greece has declared a 10-mile flight information zone in conjunction with its plans to raise its territorial water limits to 12 miles.
- Greece has refused to come to an agreement over the continental shelf issue.
- Despite its membership in NATO Greece has insisted that the real threat to its security is from Turkey and not from the Eastern Bloc.
- Greece has continued to arm itself against Turkey and has formed armed militia brigades on the Aegean islands. It has beefed up its forces on the Turkish border in the Thrace and has established regional commands on the Aegean islands.
- Greece has persistently worked against Turkey in international forums.
- Greece has given sanctuary and support to terrorists fleeing from Turkey.
- Greece has provided free movement facilities to Armenian terrorists.
- Greece has tried to restrict and to block purchases by its citizens in Turkey.
- Greece has tried to undermine Turkish tourism and has occasionally coerced European tourists to stay in the Aegean islands by spreading false rumors.
- Greece has engaged in intense lobbying activities in the United States to cut U.S. military and economic aid to Turkey.
- Greece has tried to promote traditional Turkish products such as raki and dried apricots as Greek products in European markets. It has also tried to promote the traditional Turkish puppet show, Karagoz, as a Greek play.

--The Turkish minority in Western Thrace has come under constant repression from Athens. The government has refused to recognize their rights and has tried to confiscate religious foundation properties from the Turks.

--Greece has tried everything to block Turkey's entry into the EEC. It has used its veto right in the EEC on all matters concerning Turkey.

--Greece has engaged in a deliberate collaboration with countries and groups with claims on Turkey. It has worked against Turkey in collusion with the Armenian lobby.

Greek Armed Forces

--Manpower: 136,500 men (total military personnel 209,000).

--Firepower: 1,882 tanks (106 of them Leopards), 1,375 artillery pieces, 3,750 armored personnel carriers, 1,780 antitank rockets, 14 assorted rockets.

--Air force: 336 aircraft.

--Navy: 10 submarines, 14 destroyers, 7 frigates, 16 guided-missile ships, 19 patrol boats, 16 mine-laying ships, 73 landing craft.

Turkish-Greek Trade (in dollars)

	1984	1985	1986 (first 9 months)
	-----	-----	-----
Imports	139,165,791	47,186,394	51,967,491
Exports	93,686,170	76,220,805	50,673,485

What we sell: Fish, legumes, fuel oil, petroleum products, canned escargot.

What we buy: Ammonia, viscose yarn, cold-rolled products.

Syria

Positive Features

--After a very long interval, the Syrian Prime Minister visited Turkey last spring and invited Prime Minister Ozal to Damascus.

Negative Features

--Syria has territorial claims on Hatay. In international forums it displays maps which show Hatay inside Syrian borders. Syrian children are indoctrinated against Turkey in their textbooks and are taught that Hatay is under Turkish occupation.

--Separatist and Armenian terrorists are trained and harbored in Syria.

--Fugitives from Turkish law are permitted to hide and live in Syria.

--Some destructive activities are backed by Syria. It appears that Syria is behind some of sabotage incidents in Turkey.

--Syria has provided financial assistance to some Turkish citizens of Arab origin to buy large tracts of land in the regions to benefit from the Southeast Anatolia Project.

--Syria has opposed Turkish positions in all international forums. It has openly supported the Soviet and Greek positions on the Cyprus issue.

--Syria has permitted the Soviet Union to deploy on its soil weapons which may be used against Turkey.

Syrian Armed Forces

--Manpower: 392,500 men.

--Firepower: 4,200 tanks, 150 artillery pieces.

--Airforce: 9 fighter-bomber squadrons, 15 fighter squadrons, 100 attack helicopters.

--Navy: 2 submarines, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes, 24 guided-missile ships, 8 torpedo boats.

Turkish-Syrian Trade (in dollars)

	1984	1985	1986 (first 9 months)
	-----	-----	-----
Imports	17,794,149	16,343,910	17,181,008
Exports	61,663,135	55,803,040	45,528,652

What we sell: Meat, margarine, iron-steel products, synthetic fibers, oil shale, heavy kerosene, cotton.

What we buy: Crude oil, liquefied petroleum gas, leather.

Iran

Positive Features

--A favorable market for traditional Turkish export products.

--A neighboring country where Turkish contracting firms can work extensively during the post-war reconstruction.

Negative Features

--Iran wants to export its Islamic revolution to Turkey. To that end, it has provided moral and material support to various illegal religious organizations in Turkey.

--Iran has backed activities aimed at promoting reactionary views among the 1.5 million Turkish citizens in the FRG and to sway them away from secularism.

--Iran has supported organizations which have been responsible for various terrorist incidents in Turkey.

--Because of its war with Iraq, Iran has sometimes attacked Turkish ships in the Persian Gulf.

--Nearly 1 million Iranians have fled to Turkey because of the war and the Khomeyni regime. SAVAMAK agents who have infiltrated this emigre Iranian community are having an adverse effect on general security in Turkey.

--Iran has opposed Turkish positions in international forums.

--Iran substantially reduced its imports from Turkey in 1986. This was reportedly due to financial difficulties. However, it is also observed that Iran prefers buying from other countries and that it will not buy from Turkey unless it has to.

--While supporting Kurdish separatists who are threatening Turkey's national unity and integrity, Iran has also promoted Alawi and Shiite views in Turkey.

--Iran protects and supports Armenian terrorists on its territory. The Armenians who were arrested for assaulting the Turkish embassy and Turkish diplomats in Tehran have not been punished.

Iranian Armed Forces

Manpower: 700,000 men.

Firepower: 1,000 tanks, 600 artillery pieces.

Air force: 8 fighter-bomber squadrons, 80 attack helicopters.

Navy: 3 destroyers, 4 frigates, 2 corvettes, 8 guided-missile ships.

Turkish-Iranian Trade (in dollars)

	1984	1985	1986 (first 9 months)
	-----	-----	-----
Imports	1,548,055,165	1,264,654,572	192,480,347
Exports	750,859,848	1,078,851	486,499,349

What we sell: Wheat, semolina, diammonium phosphate, construction steel, iron-steel bars, synthetic fibers and yarns, glass, assorted metal plates, aluminum products, livestock.

What we buy: Crude oil, zinc ore, light oils.

Iraq

Positive Features

--Iraq has permitted Turkey to engage in "hot pursuit" operations inside its territory against separatist forces threatening Turkey.

--Iraq has kept the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline operational without interruptions enabling it to export oil and providing for Turkey's oil needs. It has worked with good will with regard to the construction of a second pipeline.

--Iraq is a favorable market for traditional Turkish export products.

--Iraq has awarded contracts to Turkish contracting firms. There is a large potential for work for Turkish contractors after the war is over.

--Iraq has occasionally come close to Turkish positions in international forums.

Negative Features

--Iraq is waging a campaign to assimilate the Turks of Kirkuk by relocating them in various parts of the country. In addition it has implemented special incentive programs to increase the Arab population in Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya. It has treated the Turks of Kirkuk very harshly and has repressed them.

--Iraq cannot control separatist forces within its borders. It cannot prevent activities and attacks mounted from its territory against Turkey.

--Turkish exports to Gulf countries through Iraq are adversely affected because of the lack of security in Iraq. Turkish TIR trucks and their drivers are occasionally attacked, robbed and beaten.

--Iraq reduced its imports from Turkey in 1986 because of financial difficulties. It has tried to buy from Turkey on credit and has delayed the payment of its debts.

Iraqi Armed Forces

Manpower: 845,000 men.

Firepower: 4,500 tanks, 5,500 artillery pieces.

Air force: 2 bomber squadrons, 11 fighter-bomber squadrons, 5 fighter squadrons.

Navy: 2 frigates, 6 corvettes, 10 guided-missile ships, 5 torpedo boats.

Turkish-Iraqi Trade (in dollars)

	1984 -----	1985 -----	1986 (first 9 months) -----
Imports	943,957,349	1,136,752,640	556,706,117
Exports	934,380,492	961,373,689	455,227,863

What we sell: Mutton, eggs, legumes, raisins, plastics, chemicals, automobiles, automobile tires, clothing, iron-steel products.

What we buy: Crude oil, diesel fuel, liquefied petroleum gas, leather.

Turkish Armed Forces

Manpower: 630,000 men.

Firepower: 3,700 tanks, 2,000 artillery pieces, 3,600 antitank rockets, 85 rockets.

Air force: 527 airplanes (91 F-15s, 40 F-100s, 97 F-4s, 220 F-104s, 7 C-130s, 44 C-47s)

Navy: 17 submarines, 13 destroyers, 4 frigates, 15 guided-missile ships, 11 torpedo boats, 28 patrol boats, 33 mine-laying ships, 80 landing craft.

Note: All figures on armed forces are based on data published by the London Institute of Strategic Studies in 1986. Export-import figures are from the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade.

9588

CS0: 3554/208

NATO SEEN INCREASINGLY DOUBTFUL ON DEFENSE COMMITMENT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Apr 87 p 9

[Article by Morten Larsen: "Doubt Growing in NATO"]

[Text] The Western defense alliance expects Denmark to use more money on defense. Otherwise NATO's northern region will be weakened, and this will shake the alliance's credibility.

Danish politicians' preliminaries to the negotiations concerning a new defense compromise are being followed with more than ordinary attention at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Highly placed sources regard the outcome of the negotiations as a decisive portent of to what extent Denmark will take its membership in the defense alliance seriously.

"Membership must be other and more than honorary membership, and all aspects of security policy must be shared by the member countries. Otherwise the alliance will lose its credibility," says a source with insight into the subtle balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Other sources say it more directly: "Danish politicians will have to open the till a little and use more money on defense. Otherwise the defense of NATO's northern region will be decisively weakened."

Here NATO is alluding first and foremost to the division--the Jutland--which Denmark is to send southward in case of war, so that it can take part in the defense of Schleswig-Holstein.

Ineffective Division

The division's good 4000 men are important for the defense of the region, and NATO is far from excited about the Social Democratic Party's proposal concerning letting one of the brigades remain home to take part in the defense of those regions in Jutland where allied reinforcements are to be landed.

Even a full Jutland division is considered a weak point in the defense of Schleswig-Holstein at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This is due to the fact that the division will first be a proper division when it has been mobilized,

and that it will take time to get the division turned into an effective military unit, because Denmark has called up so few draftees in recent years that many of the division's soldiers will be reserve soldiers with compulsory service many years behind them.

"In the early period after mobilization the division will be made up of men in uniform, not soldiers. Only if we get a long notice--about 30 days--will the division be able to accomplish its missions as a military unit," says a highly placed NATO source.

NATO Headquarters also believes it can notice the effects of the fact that the Danish armed forces have been on a financial starvation diet for a number of years.

"In many cases officers have had to choose the next-best solutions," says a source, who thinks that the thinning out of the army has gone so far that the Danish Home Guard will be better at coping with its primary missions than the regular army will be able to accomplish its.

"Regardless of how it is turned over in one's mind, more money will have to be used--for more training and personnel for the army, for one thing. And the money must be granted without cutbacks in the navy and air force," says a NATO source, who with this rejects the Social Democratic Party's proposal for a new defense compromise.

He does this because the Social Democratic Party wants to procure money for the army by tightening the air force's and navy's belts. The Social Democratic Party wants to take away from the air force and navy their roles in NATO's advanced defense in the Baltic, and this worries NATO Headquarters.

"This will leave holes in the line of defense, which in this case are presumably to be filled by West Germany. The West Germans do not have the capacity for this," says a NATO source.

NATO Headquarters fears most of all the longterm consequences of one or more NATO member countries' not carrying their share of the load in a joint defense. This can weaken the Soviet Union's belief in the fact that the allies have a real determination to stand together in defense, and this can make the U.S. Congress begin to consider bringing home some of the approximately 300,000 soldiers that the USA has stationed in Europe at the moment. If this happens, NATO can lose the ability to defend itself against a sudden attack.

"The Danes would be wise to recall that the Atlantic Pact is an agreement between independent nations. It does not involve supranational agencies, and is therefore not credible in itself. It is only if the member countries constantly display solidarity and the determination to share the load," a highly placed NATO source states.

8831

CSO: 3613/68

SDP DEFENSE SPOKESMAN REJECTS GOVERNMENT FUNDS REQUEST

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Apr 87 p 9

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Hjortnaes: Zero Solution After Election Too"]

[Text] The government's proposal concerning an increase in the draftee force is not "overstated," believes Social Democratic Party negotiator Karl Hjortnaes. But the money must be found in the present budget, and the government's proposal concerning 400 million extra for next year is being turned down.

"There will be no defense compromise this side of an election day if the government sticks to its demand for a 400-million-kroner increase. And the Social Democratic Party will still stick to its demand for a zero solution after the election day."

The Social Democratic Party's defense policy coordinator, Karl Hjortnaes, will not agree to a defense compromise on the basis of the government's proposal concerning a 400-million-kroner increase in 1988 and a gradual increase from year to year to an extra 800 million kroner in 1992.

Today the government is discussing the final elements of the proposal, which BERLINGSKE TIDENDE was able to report on in outline yesterday. The draftee force is to be increased by a good 2000.

The government thinks that the Social Democratic Party's zero solution will mean direct reductions. According to the proposal by the government, it is necessary to have annual real growth in the defense budget.

"It is hard to interpret the government's proposal as setting the stage for a compromise with the Social Democratic Party. There are neither economic nor political bases for demanding more money," says Karl Hjortnaes, and he calls a proposal with increased appropriations "without sense and reason."

The Social Democratic negotiator believes that the armed forces have already been taken care of through the existing wage and price growth regulator.

"I do not at all doubt that the government will get the money through the favorable regulator, which the Social Democratic Party also wants to continue," says Karl Hjortnaes.

The Social Democratic Party is ready to enter into negotiations with the government parties concerning a new defense compromise, but Karl Hjortnaes says that the economic conditions are the armed forces' present budget. This applies also to increasing the draftee force, where Karl Hjortnaes thinks that "2000 new draftees does not seem to be an overstated figure to me."

"We are well aware of the fact that it is necessary to inject more money into certain areas of the armed forces. So we are ready to find it elsewhere. If something is given higher priority, then something must be given lower priority," Karl Hjortnaes believes, and he is preparing for long negotiations with the government.

"The resources in the armed forces are not distributed according to need today, but according to a key the armed forces themselves have specified," Karl Hjortnaes says.

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CSO: 3613/68

DENMARK

MILITARY

GOVERNMENT BUDGET PROPOSAL SEEKS TO KEEP AREA GARRISONS

Some Garrisons Cut

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Mar 87 p 4

[Article by Per Lyngby: "The Government's New Plan"]

[Text] The government will not remove the soldiers from South Jutland, even though a study panel recommended this. Odense, Viborg and Arhus are being hit with shutdowns of barracks.

The government will keep the barracks in Tonder and the sergeants school in Sonderborg, while there will be drastic cutbacks at the barracks in Viborg, Arhus and Odense.

This was reported by Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) and Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative Party), when they presented yesterday the government's proposal for manning the Jutland and Funen barracks. The plan will now be discussed with the Social Democratic Party, and, for one thing, it sets the stage for 2000 more draftees.

Regiments will be moved about over a period of five years, and up to 800 military personnel who will have to move will be affected. But Hans Engell really expects that considerably fewer will have to move.

This is because of the fact that many will be retrained, and that the transfers will be regulated by accession and discharges at the respective barracks.

The government's proposal entails operating savings of 15 million kroner a year. There will be an additional saving by the fact that the number of transfers will be reduced considerably.

Today many officers typically do service at 18 to 20 barracks in the course of their careers, the defense minister reports. This will be changed by the fact that more soldiers will be gathered in Holstebro, Skive and Varde, for example.

The one-time expenses for reorganizing the barracks are estimated at 147 million kroner.

"In the negotiations with the Social Democratic Party, the government will propose that the money which comes in through the sale of the barracks remain in the armed forces' till. The armed forces will thereby be able to keep their own gain from the efficiency measures and use the money for some of the investments there will be in other areas," Hans Engell says.

Paper Discusses Garrison Situation

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Mar 87 p 10

[Editorial: "The Garrisons"]

[Text] Soldiers from the Second Signal Battalion in Tønder carried the city's mayor, Kurt Sandahl Sørensen, in triumph when they got the news that the government will keep the city's barracks and sergeants school in Sønderborg, while, in return, cutbacks will take place at the barracks in Viborg, Århus and Odense.

Kurt Sanddahl [as published] Sørensen can share the credit for the revised garrison plan with the prime minister, the defense minister, South Jutland Folketing members and the local Liberal county mayor, all of whom to the end had difficulty in convincing party colleagues--in the government, too--that other cities must pay the price for keeping the South Jutland barracks. It is understandable that the South Jutlanders are especially happy. And in spite of everything everyone should express satisfaction, along with them, with the fact that the garrison plan is at last ready for negotiations with the Social Democratic Party, and--especially--that transfers are being reduced so that officers will no longer risk having to do service in 18 to 20 different places.

It was about time that the government's plan came onto the table. It is to be hoped that the Social Democrats will not hold up a final clarification--and thereby the peace, which thousands of the armed forces' personnel have sought for five years now, concerning the location of their future place of service. To keep up this uncertainty does not reflect modern personnel policy.

8831

CSO: 3613/64

OFFICER EXAMINES FORCES CAPABILITY FOR 'CRISIS MANAGEMENT'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 27 Mar - 2 Apr 87 p 8

[Op Ed Article by Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Clemmesen under the rubric "Defense Debate": "The Mouse Complex"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Text] Crisis management has become a fashionable term in Danish defense policy. The expression elegantly blurs the fact that a defense system, in spite of everything, must deter a war, and that this occurs by establishing forces that can fight credibly. Lieutenant Colonel Clemmesen takes the concept up for critical assessment before the defense compromise.

Crisis management has been a melodious and positive element in the Danish security policy debate for about 20 years. Unfortunately, this automatically positive attitude has not provided an occasion for an analysis and assessment of this concept's relevance and applicability in the Danish context.

Like so much else in our defense policy, its application in the debate has been characterized by the automatic, confusion and mistakes. It can now be stated that this regrettable situation has spread. Now we see the concept moved from public officials' and the usual couple of journalists' internal debates and role playing to the current defense policy debate as an argument for strengthening the army's effort preparedness in peace time. For example, Knud Damgaard noted in an interview with the daily INFORMATION, which was carried on the day of Christmas Eve, 1986: "The most important objective of a defense system is to be able to manage a crisis, and here effort preparedness--i.e., the force which can be brought into action here and now without having to mobilize--is of great importance." In the Social Democratic proposal for modernization of the defense system, mobilization is called an "alarming escalation."

We are all of the opinion that the defense system's primary objective is the prevention of war and attacks on the country. This is one reason for the above-mentioned long-standing interest in "managing" crises. The defense system must of course contribute to avoiding catastrophe in a high-tension "gray area" period between peace and war, too. But is this what we normally mean when we talk about crisis management here at home? Actually, not.

Crisis Management

The term crisis management is applied without closer consideration to the assertion of sovereignty which is carried out under slightly extraordinary conditions. And crisis management under these conditions is accordingly confused with NATO's attempts to signal both resolution and restraint while building up joint defense preparedness during a serious and intense East-West crisis. That is, with the alliance's efforts at crisis control, where appeasement and restraint must all the time be balanced against the need to deter undesirable actions and to build up defense capacity.

In our use of the term crisis management we often see a mixture of lack of knowledge concerning our opponent and of an attitude toward our own importance which could be compared to a mouse that carefully avoids falling into step with the elephant during passage of the bridge.

A new variation can be glimpsed behind the quotation's and the Social Democratic proposal's use of the term crisis management: Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein cannot be defended effectively by the Danish-German forces. We are therefore dependent on American and British reinforcements. Until they come, we will have to manage the crisis by, like the mouse, not provoking the bridge. We must avoid those steps toward building up Denmark's defense capacity which we, in self-overrating and ignorance, think can annoy. Moreover, we will certainly hear that these steps do annoy. We must manage by not provoking via our defense capacity. We must keep ourselves small until we are rescued and again can say "boo" or "ugh" and the crisis will perhaps disappear by itself.

The "Scenarios"

In order to be able to analyze the Danish defense system's role and possibilities during crises, it is reasonable to take as our point of departure the various situations which up to now have formed the basis for debates and crisis management.

Situation I: the Good Old Straits Problem

A deterioration of East-West relations has occurred. The climate is now as it generally could have been during the Berlin and Cuba crises. There is the possibility that escalation can immediately take place to a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. During the crisis the Soviet Union indicates its "right" to completely free passage through the straits during the naval unit's passage out. Gross violations of rules of passage and collisions with Danish vessels occur during this.

Situation II: the More Fashionable One

Intense unrest in Poland results in streams of boat people over the Baltic. Many make for Bornholm in the process. A Polish warship also flees and, pursued by other Warsaw Pact ships, makes for Danish territorial waters.

If the situation, moreover, answers to a further development of what we saw in Poland six years ago, it can be seen that it occurred as a parallel to the Swedes' situation during the U-137 submarine incident. That is, it is a question of a peacetime confrontation between two nations without risk of escalation to war. The international situation is not explosive. It is a question of demonstration of a little country's sovereignty interests confronted with the ego of a Great Power. The "crisis" lies in balancing the regard for one's own re-election with the regard for saving the Great Power's face out of regard for future relations. In order to have any choice, the capacity--primarily in the navy--to reinforce and maintain the repulsion concept in the Baltic is required. Management of the "crisis" lies in the instructions to the ship commanders and in unequivocal diplomatic demonstration, regardless of whether the violation takes place or is prevented.

During a Serious East-West Crisis

If the violation close to Bornholm or in the straits takes place in the context of a very serious crisis after a drastic deterioration of East-West relations, the situation is completely different. Then steps to control the crisis are not primarily a national question.

In addition, it can be said that during a serious international crisis considerations which are of great importance in a democracy in peace time will have to be given lower priority. International law, humanitarian and domestic policy considerations can carry less weight than the desire to not expose the fleet's few and costly combat units to a great risk of destruction via collision or the first combat actions. It can very well be appropriate to limit the assertion of sovereignty during a serious crisis, while monitoring and the intelligence service are given increased emphasis.

The risk of escalating the crisis will be so infinitesimal that it ought to govern the country's actions in just individual areas. When a small country is not at the center of the crisis, it has to act drastically or pointedly to contribute at all to escalation of the crisis. And even with its position at the straits, it is quite unlikely that Denmark would find itself at the center of a serious crisis. Because the country will not get into this situation, there are only two actions that can possibly worsen the situation. The first is if we, unprovoked and deliberately, start important acts of war. We hardly have the capacity for this. The second is if we, lacking understanding of the situation, pointedly fail to build up preparedness that is such that we show solidarity with our alliance partners.

No other actions that we might take in order to build up national defense preparedness can have a negative influence on the course of the crisis.

Knud Damgaard's statement to INFORMATION demonstrates a desire to show restraint, which can seem commendable on the face of it. But it is restraint which will mean reduced freedom to act if a serious crisis should become a reality.

Peacetime Preparedness

As I described it in an earlier article in this paper, concentrating on effort preparedness in peace time---with a given budget---can occur only at the expense of the wartime force's size and quality. Even maintenance of the present fictitious effort preparedness means that the training will be less purposeful and thereby poorer than it otherwise could be. This also means that the army's combat strength will have to be cut more in coming years than would otherwise be necessary. Maintenance of the fiction also means less ability to save the necessary money for the purchase of materiel and ammunition. Concentration on effort preparedness in peace time affects the possibilities for creating a capacity to defend Denmark long and well enough so that the capacity will appear credible. That is, this concentration can reduce the defense system's attack-prevention ability and reduce the likelihood that, among other things, allied air reinforcements will be sent here.

In a serious international crisis, it is the capacity and determination to mobilize an effective defense capacity that can contribute to controlling the course of the crisis. The alliance must display both resolution and restraint during a crisis. The mobilization of the little country of Denmark's self-defense system will, without any possibility of a misunderstanding, be a signal that shows both of these things. With the---really defensive---self-defense system mobilized, diplomatic steps to reduce tension will be able to be taken, also without the possibility of being misunderstood.

Then the question can be asked whether there will be time to mobilize Denmark's effort preparedness so that it can contribute to the alliance's attempts at crisis control. This is sometimes rejected with the argument that an attack today will come with a warning of hours. This is a demonstration of comparing indications that war is on the point of being likely--the "strategic" alert--with indications of a directly imminent attack--the "tactical" alert.

Preparedness

We are now in a situation of peace, where a war is not probable. It has not been difficult before in the last 100 years of history to recognize, when the international situation had deteriorated so much, that a war was likely. It is with a greater likelihood of war that effort preparedness is built up, if it has been chosen to give it low priority in peace time. It is correct that it is difficult to give a longer tactical warning when war is likely. It is certainly too late to build up effort preparedness with an attack warning. But we are not in this situation now, of course. With regard to the strategic alert it can be said that there is hardly doubt any longer that the Soviet Union will seek peace in the next few years for internal reforms in order to ensure continued strength. Things can change, but not without warning.

The quotation at the beginning of this article demonstrates that nothing seems to have been learned since the year 1039. It must be emphasized once again that a small nation's defense preparations do not provoke but just annoy the one that hoped it would not happen. It can be because he has the intention to attack and wants to exploit the weak defense and accordingly will have

problems. However, it can also be because undesired political resolution is signaled by this.

The mobilization of our army forces, which are light and without real offensive capacity, could be viewed as destabilizing escalation only in the heads of those who know nothing about the capabilities of military forces. And this characteristically does not apply to politicians with a Marxist-Leninist background like our Russian friends. Preparations for defense with the mobilization of Danish army forces, with the excavation of positions, the clearing of shooting ranges and the setting up of obstacles--regardless of what they say--will not be seen as dangerous and escalating by them. The same applies to the laying of mine fields in Danish territorial waters.

Not crisis management, but the assertion of sovereignty in peace time and defense in crisis.

The Mouse Complex

The discussion of the past nearly 20 years concerning Danish crisis management has been characterized by the confusion of situations where the risk of a Great Power conflict was minimal and of situations where there was some talk of building up Danish defense preparedness as part of the alliance's attempts to control the crisis and prepare the defense system. The treatment of the subject has been characterized by some traditions from the navy's assertion of sovereignty during two world wars. However, it has also been characterized by opinions which reside like ingrained relics in Danish foreign policy circles. Because of that very limited knowledge of military means, there lives in parts of these circles a belief that restraint--non-provocation--is not only a small country's natural guideline in security policy. It is also regarded as essential to display the utmost restraint in building up the national self-defense system during an international crisis. It is an attitude with roots back in the debate concerning Copenhagen's fortifications around the turn of the century. The latest application of the term crisis management--as presented in the quotation--continues this "mouse complex."

When one analyzes with an open mind the situations from the last couple of hundred years of history in which small nations tried to keep their balance through threatening situations by restraint in defense preparedness, one is called to sobermindedness. So too if one studies the international crises and the wars in which Denmark was directly involved. In these we managed nothing with our resolutions concerning restraint. It can be said that during Great Power crises small nations act wisely by not thinking that they still have the influence they have under more relaxed international conditions. During Great Power crises the wise government in a small country concentrates on arranging strong effort preparedness, and on increasing the defense system's staying power and reducing the society's vulnerability. In contrast to here at home, there is a historical understanding of these conditions in both Switzerland and Sweden.

But this certainly does not rule out the fact that, as hinted in the quotation, one will choose all the same to display extra restraint during an international crisis, will choose to concentrate totally on taking an independent and free negotiating line in relation to our alliance partners. Why, NATO is possibly only a peacetime alliance, and so it is certainly good to hedge one's bets. But is it a good idea to signal this now?

NORWEGIAN, FINNISH SECURITY POLICY FUNDAMENTALS COMPARED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial roundup]

[Excerpt] Speculation in Norway and Finland concerning a back door to the militarily sensitive area between Tromso and Bodo will probably never stop, writes chief editor Bo Stenstrom in the ABO UNDERRATTELSE, where he comments on the views expressed by Norwegian Lieutenant General Vigleif Eide in HELSINGIN SANOMAT and on other opinions revealing amateurish misconceptions of our Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance [with the USSR] as constituting a set of keys to that door.

"One reason for the difference in viewpoints found in Norway and Finland is that there is a greater inclination in Norwegian military circles to focus on a war with winners and losers, while we in Finland and Sweden put the emphasis on preventing war itself."

Even those circles in Norway which know that the friendship treaty is not a military pact and that it has reference in all cases to Finnish territory are suspicious of the section on consultation--if Finland and the Soviet Union agree that threats to the Soviet Union include a threat to Soviet territory from northern Norway, might they not agree as well that the Soviet Union should launch a preemptive attack through Finland?

That despite the fact that both parties must confirm that the threat exists and even though Finland itself must defend its own territory as befits a sovereign state, not relying on assistance from the Soviet Union except as a last-ditch effort. Preemptive attacks would appear to be as far removed from last-ditch defense as one can get.

The most important point is that this is contrary to the friendship treaty's basic political function. The Soviet political leadership is not sitting around waiting for an opportunity to use some excuse or other to send three divisions the entire laborious way across northern Finland, since the political cost would be many times higher than the purely military cost.

A military move in one part of Finland would affect the role of the entire state of Finland in Nordic stability and would have immediate and major consequences throughout North Europe--all to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union!

For the same reason, we in Finland do not speculate as to whether northern Norway would be the presumptive starting point for an attack on the Soviet Union through northern Finland. We trust Norway's policy and its government.

11798

CSO: 3650/101

REPORTER ACCOMPANIES RESERVIST EXERCISE IN HANKO

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Mar 87 p 14

[Text] Dragsvik (KI)--The fatherland's "blue" troops repel the "yellow" occupation troops on the Hanko Peninsula and recapture all ground.

That, in brief, is the scenario for the late winter's major combat exercise in Syndalen using Finland-Swedish reservists from Helsinki and western Uudenmaan.

Plans for the reservist exercise were being made throughout last week by reserve officers. The men reported in yesterday morning, and before noon, activity in the Nyland Brigade was approaching the point where organized action turns into a form of chaos.

Reservists were running around with various items of equipment, their personal weapons hanging around their necks or over their shoulders, and nothing--neither caps nor the light blue long underwear--seemed to fit.

Today, the reservist chaos from yesterday is scarcely noticeable at the brigade, the reason being that all the reservists are already out in the field to participate in target practice and other basic training.

Biggest Exercise in a Long Time

The current exercise using Swedish-speaking reservists is one of the Nyland Brigade's largest in a very long time.

"It is a very important exercise for us, but a matter of routine for the cadre personnel," says Lieutenant Colonel Lars Stenstrom, the brigade's commander.

Agreeing with him is Colonel Karl-Johan Fredriksson of the Western Finland Military District, who kicked off the entire exercise.

"Reservist exercises are becoming steadily more important, since our defense concept calls for using the entire reserve as a preventive force in defense of our territory.

"That is why it is important for everyone who is called up to participate in the exercises," says Fredriksson.

Finland-Swedes Unwilling

The fact is that Finland-Swedes make a greater effort than their Finnish-speaking colleagues in the reserve to avoid the exercises. That, in turn, places a strain on the authorities' resources, since they must find replacements for all those who for some reason are exempted from taking part in the exercises.

This week, a full Swedish-speaking battalion has been put together. The exact number is surrounded by military hush-hush, but it involves about 1,000 men, including a few hundred conscripts.

But the usefulness of reservist exercises is questioned by most of the reservists. Harri Lindstrom from Hanko does not believe that the reserve troops learn anything new during the 5 full days of exercises.

Lindstrom had his own sleeping bag and bedding with him. There was also a little fruit among his things.

"The worst part is when the cold nips at you," he says, but he does not think the exercise is going to use up his energy. His job is to cook for the other reservists.

Combat Tomorrow

The real combat exercise is to begin tomorrow, when, following today's basic training, the reservists will be transformed into defenders of the fatherland and hunt down an enemy who has landed on the Hanko Peninsula. The war will then continue until Friday.

The outcome has already been decided. According to the script covering the exercise, the enemy will be beaten back, and the Hanko Peninsula will again be secured--until the next reservist exercise.

11798

CSO: 3650/101

BRIEFS

MINISTER SATISFIED WITH DEFENSE BUDGET--(FNB)--Minister of Defense Veikko Pihlajamaki (Center Party) feels that the Finnish defense budget is on solid ground for the moment. Pihlajamaki, who spoke in Joensuu on Saturday, emphasized in particular that Finnish suppliers are providing an ever-increasing share of military purchases. According to Pihlajamaki, domestic suppliers will soon be providing nearly half of all new purchases. At the same time, he emphasized the importance of the new procurement authorizations, which have made it possible to plan new purchases in a more methodical and long-term manner than was possible previously. According to Pihlajamaki, women should also be educated more thoroughly concerning the foundations of our national defense and Finland's security policy. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 9 Mar 87 p 5] 11798

CSO: 3650/101

ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS SEEN BEHIND CALL FOR U.S. TROOP REDUCTION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 23 Mar 87 p 13

[Article by Alejandro Munoz Alonso: "For a NATO without an 'N' "]

[Text] With only 2 weeks left before a new session in Spanish-U.S. negotiations on the reduction of U.S. troops in Spain, no possibility of an agreement is seen on the immediate horizon. Weinberger's visit last week and the subsequent reactions by one side and the other have served to place in evidence the poor climate of relationships existing between Madrid and Washington. Our country, together with Greece, thus confirms its status as a "quarrelsome ally," the generator of headaches for the officials of the State Department and the Pentagon. That the large European countries are incomparably less punctilious is a subject for thought.

The lack of understanding resides in a different concept of what is in play. For the Spanish Socialist Government it is a matter that is exclusively bilateral that opposes the national interests of both countries, without any noticeable effects in the area of the collective security of the Western World. On the basis of that idea, the Gonzalez Government does not accept the permanence of some bases that are said to serve only U.S. interests and could involve Spain in actions or policies they do not share. These are precisely the arguments used by Papandreou.

For the Reagan Administration, on the other hand, the bases established in our territory are part of the Western defense system and any diminution in their operational capabilities would affect the entire Atlantic Alliance. That explains why the United States shared its concern with other allied countries--on the Spanish side there is talk of "pressures"--in an attempt to help make the Spanish Government understand and accept that the matter goes beyond the strict framework of bilateralness, regardless of the literal subject of the agreements.

The unease because of the weakness of the southern flank of NATO is not an improvisation for pressuring Spanish Socialist diplomacy. Some experts are already talking about a NATO without an "N", which means a NATO expanded toward Africa and even the South Atlantic, a critical zone in the international balance. The Atlantic Alliance cannot limit its strategy to the possible threat coming from East Europe when Soviet bases in the Indian

Ocean and the Red Sea (Socotora, Ethiopia and South Yemen) and the existence in the southern Mediterranean of states such as Algeria and Libya, could become jumping off points for an offensive against the "underbelly" of NATO. That also explains the honeymoon between the United States and Morocco--for which Spain could pay the expenses if our diplomacy does not assume a bit of realism--and its concern about Angola and the future of the entire region of South Africa.

Spanish public opinion has the right to be seriously informed about the problem of collective security, up to now subjected to an emotional and topical treatment. Our foreign and defense policies continue to ride the tiger of a primal and visceral anti-Americanism, fueled by the Socialists themselves, with respect to which our confirmed stay in NATO has become a sort of hostage. It is not a responsible action that the government, which does not yet know the way in which we are going to be integrated into the Atlantic Alliance, has no approximate idea--as can be deduced from its answers to questions from opposition deputies--of how much the reduction of American troops in our country is going to cost us. It is not acting seriously either, despite that, to declare that "there is no doubt that Spain can assume the cost regardless of the result of the process initiated."

It is time to establish national interests, that must be imposed above all other considerations, clearly and without demagoguery. It is also time to make a commitment, without neutralist nostalgias, to the collective security of the world to which we belong.

8908

CSO: 3548/63

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Mar 87 pp 44-46

[Interview with Army Chief of Staff General Miguel Iniguez del Moral by Cristina Garcia Santamaria of CAMBIO 16; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Miguel Iniguez del Moral, chief of staff of the army, believes that the decision to allow the return of some members of the defunct Democratic Military Union, removed from the armed forces in 1976, has been obeyed by the institution pursuant to the order from the Parliament and Government.

Born in the Burgos region of Belorado 72 years ago, General Iniguez del Moral has in his hands the development of the army, in which in the hardest and most direct manner he is carrying out the necessary reorganization in personnel and materiel that the Socialist Government put into effect since 1982.

During past years he has been immersed in the process of transformation of the army. His direct collaboration with Lieutenant General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, when decisive steps were being taken in democratic transition, represents an important phase in the attainment of the first achievements for the modernization of the armed forces and he recalls it with great fondness.

His military life has been marked by a consistent mixture of important military assignments (Jaca Mountain School, creator and chief of the Engineer Battalion, Sahara Staff, chief of staff of the Paratrooper Brigade and captain general of the Western Pyrenees Region) and bureaucratic assignments (Chief of the Joint Staffs, Plans Division), which have given him the training required for rising to the most important post of the army.

Considered an eminently professional military man, he will have to make the best use of his sincere and conciliatory talents in confronting the fears and discouragement brought about by some measures such as the reduction in personnel rolls, the unification of the Captain General areas or the return of some members of the Democratic Military Union.

CAMBIO 16: Has the formula used by the government for resolving the case of the Democratic Military Union (UMD) had some worrisome result in the armed forces? Is there, or has there existed some unease with respect to the reintegration into active service of some of its members?

Miguel Iniguez: The solution adopted has been adopted by other levels of government, which in a state of law are legitimately authorized and responsible: The Parliament and the Government. Every military man, like all other citizens, must obey it. In our case, regardless of the thoughts and innermost feelings of each one, into which for obvious reasons I will not delve, it is a matter of strict obedience. I can assure you that aware and thoughtful obedience should not be any problem for a military man. As for the unease to which you refer in your question, if it did exist it was of an individual nature; in no case has it existed in the institution as such.

CAMBIO 16: You have collaborated actively in the development of the main programs of army modernization, specifically you took part in preparing the so called META Plan. What does its application mean for the army and what lines of work do you plan to follow from Staff Headquarters for the culmination of the program?

Miguel Iniguez: The Army Modernization Plan (META) is undoubtedly the most important plan. However, it must be pointed out that it is a modernization program that means an improvement in the organization and operation of the army. It is not easy to take the step from a structure organized in a specific form to another significantly different. It requires a great effort in planning, coordination, implementation and execution. Of course it means sacrifice. Movements of units bring with them the movement of a large number of people and adjustments of employment that are not easy to carry out, taking into account that they not only affect the professionals, but also their families.

The lines of work to be followed are clear. We shall conclude the adaptation of the Captain General Areas to the new structure, and deployments of units will be terminated after the logistic problems caused by the plan have been resolved, pursuant to a 4-year plan that we shall present soon.

CAMBIO 16: Your passage through the Burgos Captain General area has meant the application of the META plan to this military region. Has it been completed or has there not been enough time for its total accomplishment?

Miguel Iniguez: Practically 90 percent of the deployment has been completed, for which reason it can be said that the reorganization of the Captain General Area of the Western Pyrenees Region is in the most advanced phase, although there remain some minor aspects whose final resolution will be accomplished soon.

CAMBIO 16: Year after year one of the most necessary programs for the army has been delayed: The renewal of the combat tanks. In what phase is that program?

Miguel Iniguez: There are many programs necessary for the army, because we find ourselves at a level which honestly does not satisfy us. Our work is to make this level improve in a progressive manner as is stipulated in the Joint Strategic Plan--PEC---. We are in a full process of updating our force, which up until a short time ago was obsolete. Much remains to be done, particularly if we consider the limitations of our economic resources and the delays in delivery dates for materials already purchased. As far as the combat tanks are concerned, a program that is among the most important, the government has recently approved the modernization of the AMX-30, which will give us an increase in the operational capabilities of our present armored equipment. The force of operational armored equipment we have available is small and in good measure old and the complete modernization of the AMX-30 will mean a step forward.

CAMBIO 16: The army has been the most affected by the Personnel Law. What has the large reduction in the number of members of this army meant, and how have the professionals affected accepted its consequences?

Miguel Iniguez: The Personnel Law has meant a significant reduction in the number of members of the army on active duty. It is another sacrifice for many of those affected and for the army itself because it is hard to face the fact of having to leave active duty before the regulation period. However, it has been accepted with discipline and up to now there has been no need to use the mandatory transfer to the temporary reserves. The basic idea behind this law is the reduction in the number of personnel, compensated for by an improvement in materiel for adequately responding to present operational needs.

CAMBIO 16: Focusing on the modernization of the army, one of the most awaited plans is that of updating military education, which up to this time appears to have resulted in nothing. What type of reforms do you consider imperative for adapting present methods to the requirements for training a European professional?

Miguel Iniguez: It is an extremely complex question. It must be pointed out that the Spanish military men who are studying abroad obtain brilliant grades generally. However, this does not mean that our educational system does not need greater improvement, due to a need of continued adaptation to the changes in society, and, of course, combat techniques. We are engaged in this and it is one of the objectives of my work.

CAMBIO 16: In recent years military service has undergone important changes, however, it does not seem to compensate for the sacrifices it entails and doubts continue as to its usefulness. What changes should be included for a greater effectiveness?

Miguel Iniguez: The fundamental line to be followed is a greater dedication and effort in specifically military training as soldiers, an insistence on improvement in citizenship and the maximum use of free time in sports, cultural and educational activities that will serve as substitutes and disuasions from present habits such as drugs or alcohol.

CAMBIO 16: Precisely one of the subjects that most concerned the previous chief of staff of the army was the alarming figures and data of the statistics on drug addiction, alcoholism, suicides and accidents within the army. What measures are being taken to prevent these incidents as much as possible?

Miguel Iniguez: Statistics reveal some figures that actually worry us. However, the problem must be placed in the proper perspective. There are no more accidents among the young people who perform military service than those that happen in a similar group of young people out of military service. This does not justify the former but it helps to consider the scope of the problem with some accuracy.

We take all the precautions possible. Regulations in this respect are exhaustive and of constant application. Suicide is another problem that worries us. The Army Psychology Service, after a detailed study, has confirmed that those who committed suicide in their majority came to us with a predisposition to suicide. Our preventive action is aimed at the detection of that psychic predisposition, since it is a factor that indicates danger. The psychological tests that all recruits take when they join the ranks are an effective measure. A second path is that of preventing, as much as possible, loneliness of the soldier during his service.

The army has been the first institution that seriously dealt with the problem of drugs. The immediate result has been that the consumption of drugs by soldiers is less than that of the young in general. That practice is severely punished in the barracks.

CAMBIO 16: Do you believe that there is a lack of awareness of the need for national defense among the citizens?

Miguel Iniguez: We Spaniards, the immense majority of us, have an awareness of the need for our defense. But this does not exclude the fact that such an awareness is on many occasions very vague. Spain is a country that has not suffered a foreign invasion for almost 180 years. As a result, we have not assimilated the fact that unfortunately danger has not passed or we view it as something very far off. For a Frenchman or a Russian this question, because it is obvious, is not posed; they keep it in mind and they act accordingly.

CAMBIO 16: The zone covered by the Captain General Area of Burgos has kept you in direct contact with the problem of the Basque Country. What position should the armed forces take towards those events and what is your opinion about a possible participation by the army in the fight against terrorism?

Miguel Iniguez: The position of the armed forces has been, and will always be, clear and categorical: Total rejection and disapproval. Nothing legal can be built on the blood of hundreds of bodies of victims of premeditated and stealthy murders.

As for a possible participation by the army in counterterrorist struggle, I have to tell you that the army is an institution at the service of society and it is ruled by legitimately established powers. It is the responsibility of the executive branch to carry out the struggle in the way it believes proper in every circumstance.

8908

CSO: 3548/63

NATIONAL ARMS INDUSTRY SALES DETAILED

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 16 Mar 87 pp 34, 36-39

[Article by Alfredo Semprun: "Arms, a Growing Business"]

[Text] Aerial bombs made in Spain and loaded with poison gases have caused the first known victims of chemical warfare since World War I. It is calculated that some 400 Iranian soldiers and militiamen have been killed by the terrible "mustard gas" between 1984 and 1985. Proof appears conclusive: Some of the containers dropped by Iraqi aviation belong to a bomb lot made by the Explosivos Alaveses, S.A. of Victoria, possibly in 1983.

A group of international specialists, among whom was Doctor Manuel Dominguez, a colonel in the Army Medical Corps, a specialist in ABC weapons (atomic, bacteriological and chemical) and a professor at the University of Madrid, toured several zones of the Iranian-Iraqi front in March 1984, scene of the alleged chemical attacks by the aviation of Baghdad.

Around 11:00 on 13 March of that same year, several Iraqi Mirage-F1 fighter-bombers had flown a combat mission over Shatt-e-Ali, seeking to destroy an enemy artillery emplacement. The attack by the Mirages was carried out at a very low altitude, some 10 meters, to try to elude detection by Iranian radar, which they did. However, the dropping of bombs was defective--too low--and several of them did not explode. It appears that there was not enough time for the arming fuses to function.

One of those projectiles was examined by technicians the following day. According to photographs taken on the same field of battle and the examination of the interior and exterior of the device, it was concluded that it was a 250-kilo bomb with a time delay fuse made in Spain to be used as a white phosphorus container. The Iraqis had replaced its original contents with "mustard gas."

The reason why it did not explode could be found on the bomb itself. A notice engraved in its interior clearly specified that "for arming times of less than 6 seconds, remove the screw. Red viewer danger. Fuse MU 09. LOT 83.01." Obviously the Iraqi armorer had not removed "the screw," supposing that the pilot would drop it at the proper altitude.

On the other side, the bloody Iranian offensives have been maintained with the help of 105 and 155 millimeter artillery shells made in Spain. The "Revolutionary Guards" prepared the terrain for their advance with 81 and 120 millimeter mortars, also made in Spain. Explosivos Rio Tinto, Santa Barbara, Esperanza y Cia, Gamesa and EXPAL (Explosivos Alaveses) all figure as alleged suppliers of these weapons. The Santa Barba national company, which belongs to the INI [National Institute of Industry], has also sold recoilless 106 millimeter cannon to the Teheran Government.

However, there is never enough proof. The majority of shipments, although religiously paid for by Iran, have other countries as the supposed addresses: Libya, Syria, Thailand, Brazil, Jordan and Portugal have on various occasions served as a cover for this illegal trade.

Merchant ships with the flags of the Bahamas, Greece or Cameroon load French weapons in Brest, Spanish weapons in Santander, and Portuguese munitions in Lisbon. The after a refueling stop at the port of Las Palmas, they head for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

Naturally, export permits which authorize the departure of these shipments--the well-known certificates of "final user"--are granted in the names of importers of Brazil, Indonesia or Thailand...

A strange bit of information is revealed by the French newspaper L'EXPRESS: Brazil and Thailand figure as great importers of 203 millimeter ammunition, but in their respective armies they do not have weapons capable of firing this type of heavy projectile, although they are being used by the Iranian Army.

A Growing Business

The Spanish Government, through the intervention of President Felipe Gonzalez himself, has refused to allow sales of arms to Iran or any other country subjected to an embargo, however, in view of the evidence that our artillery or aerial ordinance has been used for years in many battle fronts, it acknowledges that sales can be made by legal means.

It is undoubtedly true. Spanish armament companies have been increasing their production and their exports at the rate of 5 percent annually between 1980 and 1985. This despite the fact that the list of countries subject to an embargo continues to grow and that the main industries of the state--except CASA--have lost part of their share in the international market.

Spanish private industry, which enfolds a hundred medium and small arms companies, has specialized in the productions of types of weapons such as artillery shells, mines, aerial bombs and grenades, which are what is really used on a large scale in all wars. According to international experts, these are good quality products with a competitive price and capable of being used by all armies that have materiel of western origins.

Thus, companies such as Esperanza y Cia., Santa Barbara, CASA or EXPAL compete with the best in Europe in supplying medium weapons, munitions and transport aircraft even to the U.S. forces themselves.

Legally, or through intervening ways, Spanish armament has been present in the majority of the recent military conflicts. Afghan guerrillas fight with CETME assault rifles against Soviet occupation forces, Spanish mortars are among the armament captured from the Nicaraguan "contras," Somalia has used Bazan patrol vehicles in its conflicts with Ethiopia, South African officers invaded Namibia with Spanish pistols at their waist and the Polisario Front used the same recoilless cannon against Moroccan forces that Santa Barbara had sold to the government of Hassan.

Actually, embargoes against countries with totalitarian regimes or those subjected to international trade restrictions did not go into effect in their majority until the middle of 1986, despite the frequent declarations to the contrary to which the representatives of the last Socialist governments had us accustomed.

Black List

Chile, for example, was one of our best customers between 1982 and 1986. In 1983, weapons in the amount of 2.5 billion pesetas were exported to it; in 1984 that invoice rose to 12 billion and in 1985, it was around 500 million. Even in 1986, exports of cartridges, artillery shells, machine guns, aerial bomb detonators and fuses were authorized in the amount of 350 million pesetas.

All this without counting the sale and granting of license for the manufacture of the C-101 training and attack aircraft manufactured by CASA. As part of its payment, Chile sold Spain the production license for the Pillan training aircraft, whose first units are emerging from Spanish factories these days.

Another country subjected to an embargo, to whom weapons were sold in 1986, with legal contracts of course, is Paraguay. The government of General Stroessner purchased recoilless cannon, mortars and grenades for a total of approximately 350 million pesetas from Spanish state and private companies.

Sales were also authorized in 1986 to South Africa, Turkey and other countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who apparently then supply them to Iraq. The Jordan route may be one of those followed by the EXPAL bombs to reach the depots of Iraqi aviation.

Siria and Libya, who had been playing this role in the case of Iran, went on the long embargo list in April last year, that is the reason that it is suspected that shipments of military materiel more and more needed by the regime of Khomeini are made through private intermediaries or phantom companies in exchange for commissions that run around 25 percent of the value of the overall contract.

The Spanish Administration maintains that there are no legal provisions or technical means sufficient for investigating the destination of our weapons, and that the Interministerial Commission on the Sales of Arms and Explosives is limited to controlling the granting of export licenses.

However, the "deviation" of contracts has been a usual practice by all arms exporting countries of the West--the Socialist countries and others of Asia such as Singapore do not have obstacles of political type--for the past 15 years. Spain has not been alien to this, not even in that which has to do with state companies.

Santa Barbara itself participated in a tainted operation with its partners of the German Rheinmetall Company for the sale of a shipment of anti-aircraft cannon to the Argentine Republic in 1978, which at that time was included in the list of countries contained on the FRG embargo list.

British Revelation

Rheinmetall "sold" the cannon to Santa Barbara, which assembled them in its Oviedo factory--and then it "repurchased" them. However, in the document for the new purchase, it was requested that the materiel be sent, not to Germany, but directly to Argentina.

During the Malvinas War, these cannon downed several British Harrier fighter-bombers. It was the capture of one of these pieces by the English, who made a note of the serial number, that allowed them to discover the jumbled operation.

As a result of the continued revelations that appeared in the media about this illegal traffic, there has been talk in sources close to the Ministry of Defense that the Foreign Intelligence Services of the CESID, which in theory is the agency responsible for oversight in these types of affairs, will be reinforced.

However, as business circles acknowledge, the government, all governments, face many limitations of a political and economic nature with respect to the arms business. "On one hand," said the director-manager of one of these companies to EPOCA, "it is an industry that employs many thousands of skilled workers; at the same time, exports increase production lines and as a result, prices decline. This is important because one of the best customers is the Spanish Army. The solution is not found in buying abroad. The armed forces, logically, have an increasingly greater part of their war materiel made nationally."

8908

CSO: 3548/63

RESERVE OFFICER, MILITARY SERVICE LAW REVISIONS SUMMARIZED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 5 Feb 87 p 7

[Text] The bill proposing revisions in Reserve Officer and Military Service legislation has been adopted by the Cabinet which decided to send it to the Assembly. The bill's provisions apply also to draft dodgers allowing them the option of paying fees in lieu of military service. Draft dodgers would be discharged after undergoing core training and having paid the exemption fee, provided they apply within 2 years. Core training requirement is waived for those over the draft age (reduced to 41) though demanding twice the regular fee. There are also provisions in the bill that address the prevalent teacher shortage. The bill calls for the General Staff to determine the 'surplus' with regard to strictly military needs and notify the Defense Ministry as to the numbers that could be allowed to pay fees in lieu of active military duty.

How Will the System Work?

The bill envisions that the procedure will be operating as follows:

- Following every core training period the General Staff is to determine the number to be allowed exemption taking due notice of estimates coming in from public organizations regarding needs,
- In determining the number of exemptions the number of individual requests for exemption will be taken into consideration,
- If the number of those wishing to be exempted is higher than the number specified by the General Staff then a lottery will be drawn,
- If the number of those wishing to be exempted is equal to or less than the number specified by the General Staff then a lot-

tery won't be needed; all applicants will gain exemption by paying fees,

- Those changing their minds about paying fees at a later date or failing to make the payments on time will complete the remainder of their period of duty as privates or corporals,

- The principles governing payment of fees and other procedures will be determined by the Council of Ministers.

Working For Public Organisations

The bill entails provisions to work for public organizations in lieu of active military duty:

- Public organizations, through ministries of their affiliation, will notify the Defense Ministry of their needs 2 months before each draft recall period,

- Except for those paying fees the draftees will participate in a lottery to determine who will be working for public organizations. The numbers and guidelines will be decided by the General Staff. Those belonging to specified occupational groups or fields of training will not be included in the lottery,

- Job specifications and working procedures of those to be employed by public organizations will be determined by those organizations,

- Health affairs of those employed by public organizations will be the responsibility of the latter,

- Food, clothing, shelter and other needs of those employed by public organizations will be provided by the latter.

Teaching Jobs

The bill makes provision for reserve officers -- currently serving as well as those yet to be drafted -- and privates yet to be drafted who have been working as teachers in civilian life to continue serving as teachers as part of their military service in schools affiliated to the Ministry of Education (to be referred hereafter as the Ministry).

Reserve Officers To Serve As Teachers

- Candidate reserve officers who had been teaching in civilian life, or those qualified to teach but had not yet got a teaching job with the Ministry, will be turned over to the Ministry after

completing their core training in accordance with needs specified by the Ministry and approved by the General Staff,

- If the number of career teachers falls short of the need those among reserve officers whose education renders them suitable as teachers may be turned over to the Ministry upon completion of their core training if they are willing,

- If the need is still not met a lottery will be drawn among those who are sufficiently qualified to teach but had not expressed willingness until then,

- All those coming under this category will be designated as candidate reserve officers (not privates),

- The monthly pay of the designated teachers would be the same as that of sub-lieutenants and paid by the Ministry,

- The designated teachers will not be allowed to wear uniform; the duration of their service will be the same as other reserve officers, commencing as soon as they complete the paperwork at their local military administrative offices, and at the end of their period of service will be discharged as sub-lieutenants; the location of their teaching jobs will be specified by the Ministry,

Privates Serving as Teachers:

- Those already teaching in schools under the Ministry and qualified teachers who are yet to start teaching will be designated as 'surplus' and come under the Ministry's authority after the core training is over,

- If career teachers fall short of the overall need then graduates of post-secondary schools will be brought in initially, to be followed by lycee (and equivalent) graduates if the need still remains unmet, provided that they possess the appropriate qualifications and are willing. They will be turned over to the Ministry after their core training is over,

- If the need still remains unmet those in the previous category who had not expressed a willingness to serve as teachers will be subjected to a lottery, and a number of them will be designated as teachers, their location to be specified by the Ministry,

- Those who have been working as teachers on the Ministry payroll, and those working as state employees prior to military service will continue to receive their usual salaries; and those who have not been employed as state employees before will have

their status registered in accordance with the State Employees Law from the time they start teaching; their salaries will be paid by the Ministry,

Reserve Officers Currently Under Arms

The bill makes provisions for reserve officers currently under arms to benefit from the new arrangements. Accordingly, qualified teachers serving as reserve officers at the time the bill comes into effect will be able to complete the remainder of their service teaching in line with needs expressed by the Ministry and approval of the General Staff. Those in this category may be discharged as lieutenants if their record allows, and if not as sub-lieutenants. Their official ties with the Armed Forces will not be severed and they will not be paid extra compensation for serving as teachers.

What of the Draft Dodgers?

The bill introduces a number of provisions for draft dodgers as well:

- The bill makes provision for those who, up until the date legislation comes into effect, have been dodging the draft or committing similar offences. They will be eligible to apply within 2 years from the date legislation comes into effect,

- Those in this category are required to pay the exemption fee as specified in the budget legislation every year (for 87 it is TL 2,5 million) in a lump sum. Provided they complete their core training they will be considered as having served as privates or corporals,

- Candidate reserve officers born in 46 or older will not be required to undergo core training. But their exemption fees will be twice the norm (for 87 it will be TL 5 million). They will also be given amnesty from judicial proceedings.

The same rules will apply to privates. They will also be able to work for public organizations as part of their military service.

Privates Currently Under Arms

The bill makes provision for privates and corporals currently under arms who are qualified teachers to complete the remainder of their service teaching at schools under the Ministry subject to General Staff approval. They will have their status registered in accordance with the State Employees Law from the time they start teaching. Their salaries and other compensation will be paid according to their grade from the Ministry's budget.

HANSENNE ON COMBATTING YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 11 Mar 87 p 4

[Text] Today, in the Netherlands, the house began the debate on youth unemployment; the voices to get the youth to work "forcibly" are growing stronger by the day. In Belgium the picture is no different. We interviewed Mr Hansenne, the Belgian secretary of labor; he wants to establish a legal distinction between those youths who are unwilling to work and those who are unable to work. The first group will be denied the unemployment allowance, while the second group will be eligible for the allowance.

Hansenne: "I think, and I am optimistic about it, that within a couple of years we will have solved the problems of youth unemployment. I am not worried about youth unemployment anymore, but I do worry about the youths who are unskilled. In fact, this is of great concern all throughout Europe. To put it another way: what are we going to do with those unskilled people in our society?"

This plea comes from Michel Hansenne, 46 years old, who has been the Belgian secretary of labor and employment since 1981. He is also a lawyer and economist and in these functions he has done scientific work for the Department of Sociology at the judicial faculty of the university at Luik (Belgium).

Hansenne is well known for his joviality, is a somewhat cunning person, and is straightforward in his opinions. As a matter of fact, he feels that Belgium's system of paying unemployment benefits without necessarily requiring work, is too comfortable and does not foster motivation. (By the way, Hansenne's Luik accent sounds as if he had a chronic cold.)

Hansenne: "I am of the opinion that youths who choose an easy training course just for the very reason that it is easy, should not be eligible for any employment benefits. It is for a boy so easy to say that he is cut out for, say, a woodworking class, and for a girl it is so easy to say that she cannot do more than only sewing and needlework. I am not concerned about the youth who selects his classes with motivation, since he is the one who will do all right. But I am concerned about those who don't want to look to the future at all, and question whether they really want a certain training."

Reporter: "You are, in fact, talking about youths who are motivated and those who are not."

Hansenne: "My problem is how do we prevent a teenager from saying: 'Why should I go on with my studies if instead I can collect unemployment benefits?' Therefore we need a distinction by law between the unmotivated youths and the ones, who are unable to work. These two groups should certainly not be entitled to the same privileges." I want to have a free hand to establish the difference between those who are unwilling and the ones who are unable. The former should not get a penny but the latter ones should; that is what I am going to propose in a couple of weeks."

Experts are of the opinion that the two cabinets of the government are on the right track. These two cabinets, under the leadership of Wilfred Martens, in power since December 1981, are trying to convert the so-called "everybody-for-himself" structure of the Belgian economy into a more transparent government policy. Last year income rose by 3.7 percent, of which 9 percent for self-employed, and industry is doing much better.

Last year's gross profits rose by an astronomical 34 percent, and profit margins increased by 16 percent. The drive to cut spending, saving 195 billion francs (≈ 5 billion U.S. dollars) in order to reduce the monetary deficit, has already strengthened the faith in Belgium abroad.

Yet, something does not click; labor costs are still too high to have the population as a whole enjoy the fruits of the economic recovery. And the move to cut expenses and waste will eliminate some 18,000 jobs; this will directly result in a loss of jobs, but this is the price that has to be paid to turn (a part of) the present Belgian economy into a healthy one.

Still, the unemployment is only 7,000 less than the record of February 1985, as evidenced by the recent figures published last month. During last December and January unemployment rose by 14,000 and 16,000 respectively. That means then that 462,000 (or 562,000 including the older workers) are unemployed; this represents 12 percent of the working population. The only bright spot for secretary Hansenne was the decline of the youth unemployment (presently at 178,000) by 5,659 and it still continues to drop.

Hansenne: "The sudden rise in unemployment is understandable and certainly not surprising; in May 1986 we adopted drastic cost-cutting resolutions. These resolutions were mainly aimed at our public sectors, namely in the areas of education and the unemployment projects. The immediate effect is a rise in unemployment, and that does cost money, month after month. Therefore, if someone says that the increase in unemployment is the government's fault, I certainly do agree with that, and that does not need any further comment. The labor unions cannot be held responsible for the employment consequences of these measures taken by the government."

Reporter: "How do you think this will strengthen your political position?"

Hansenne: "I am well aware that these latest figures have jolted society, but, that is the way it is and we have to admit that I do gain by it. Without these dramatic figures I might as well have abandoned my plans for the unemployment projects. It is an important part of my work to find solutions for these "shocking" situations. If I had come out at another time with my plan for 5,000 extra community civil servants, my colleagues in the government would have said: impossible. I needed a panic situation, otherwise I would not succeed."

Reporter: "How do you get industry to agree with you? One would say that the increase in profits would allow room to recruit personnel. The federation of Belgian enterprises in this respect, however, shows a hesitant attitude."

Hansenne: "Our government has, on the one side, cut costs and on the other side encouraged, through financial benefits, capital investment; this has definitely benefitted our industry, but in the framework of arriving at a healthier social security, we had to increase the social security premiums, and also the part the employer contributes. We do live in a paradoxical situation whereby the labor costs increased and the capital costs decreased.

Industry did go for the capital investment and hence the increase in profits. Now the question is do we have to start working on the reduction of labor costs. Presently we have a selective discount applied to the premiums for the social benefits for those industries that offer youths an apprenticeship contract. But there is the question if we should extend this on a broader scale. One of the main points for the 1988 budget should be a decrease of costs for social security."

Reporter: "In the past the government imposed, at one time, a social agreement; is there a possibility that the government might tell industry to hire a minimum number of personnel?"

"Why not, why not? But mind you, this year we won't do anything. Premier Martens has clearly stated that the present social agreement is satisfactory, which is the result of open negotiations; we leave the social partners alone. And that is not always pleasant for the ambitious secretary of labor, but in return there will be labor rest, social stability and freedom. Again, this year nothing will be done, and for the period 1988/89 I won't commit myself to anything but I will not exclude that we will then put pressure on industry."

Reporter: "A couple of years ago the 5-3-3 plan of the government was in the news. This was more or less in the form of telling industry to a 5-percent cut in wages, a 3-percent cut in working hours and creating 3 percent more jobs. Has this move been to any use?"

"The purpose of that plan was to halt the loss of jobs; jobs were being lost at a high rate in the early eighties. That was a merciless, radical operation, but it did stop the drain of jobs during five to six years. For that reason it turned out to be a success, but we will not do it again. This one time we did it because it was necessary, but after all, a boiler is never 100 percent efficient. The purpose was to create new jobs, but that, unfortunately, did not happen."

Reporter: "Belgium has obtained experience in flexitime with the so-called Hansenne-experiments at 65 companies. Did we learn anything from that?"

"I am not of the opinion that the cut in working hours as such creates additional jobs; something else has to happen. If you decrease the working hours from 37 to 36 without doing anything to the operation of the company, you cannot expect the number of jobs to grow; it certainly will not work if you introduce too many regulations. Therefore I said that I am prepared to close my eyes in certain experiments and to be somewhat lenient in following the law. They have to show me that they are successful and able to create jobs. This has succeeded in a surprising large number of cases. To me it is important that the employers and the unions agree on the changes in the law on flexible working hours. Within one month from now all these experiments will be past history. Then they will become official. I have now presented a bill that will change the law in such a way that my experiments are not needed anymore. This is a significant success for this government."

Reporter: "But in spite of all your efforts you are still stuck with the unskilled between the ages of 16 and 18."

"In the social agreements only the wages and the length of the working hours are clearly stipulated, but with regard to work opportunities strict rules are never made. I have now asked the social partners to be as clear regarding the work opportunities as about wages, otherwise the youths between the ages of 16 and 18, the least privileged will be left out. A teenager without sufficient education, is unable to find a job, not only here, but everywhere.

Moreover, you will notice that a lot of youths all over Europe do not know what to do with the educational programs that are offered. They quit school prematurely and join the unemployed. I think that industry should open their doors to them and provide them with a training course so that they may attend school part-time and spend the other part of their time in industry.

Industry is responsible for footing the bill for these co-ops that is easy for me to say but this is a social problem of the first order and we are still looking for an answer to this. However, it is definitely our responsibility as a human, politician, employer and labor union leader to concentrate on these problems in the coming years."

13326/8309

CSO: 3614/51

FARMERS' ORGANIZATION CHIEF: EC SUBSIDY REDUCTION DISASTROUS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Mar 87 p 21

[Article by Sigyn Alenius]

[Text] Copenhagen--Agriculture is doomed, said Hans O. Kjeldsen, leader of Denmark's top agricultural organization, the Agricultural Council, when the decision by the EC ministers to reduce milk production subsidies was announced in Copenhagen. The day before, Parliament had approved an environmental plan costing billions of kroner, the cost of which will be borne primarily by agriculture.

That's right, Danish agriculture, which for years and years has been the indomitably optimistic and future-oriented flagship of Denmark's economy. Now there is talk of eliminating 10,000 of the 50,000 agricultural units that remain. As recently as the late 1960's, there were 200,000 farms.

Things first went wrong because the farmers had invested too optimistically just before and just after Denmark joined the EC in 1973. With its guaranteed prices and guaranteed market for everything the EC area's farmers could produce, the EC was seen by the Danish farmer as a guarantee that the well-known excellence of his know-how could finally be exploited to the full. The agricultural sector built new barns, stables, and pigsties and increased its production of everything--all on credit. Interest rates were reasonable, and times were good.

Setback Arrives

But then came the setback: the oil crisis caused a general depression and ruined the market. Interest rates rose, loans became insurmountably burdensome, and 10,000 farms went out of business in a single year. An equal number went bankrupt. The state finally stepped in with the necessary assistance in the form of interest subsidies and loan refinancing. And the wheels started turning again for a while.

Then came setback number two. Agriculture received advance warning last year, when the EC slapped a fee on some milk production to limit surplus stocks. Denmark itself consumes only one-third of the foodstuffs produced by its

farmers; until now, except for the restriction on dairy products that was introduced in 1986, the rest has been exported at wonderful EC prices. The EC's guaranteed prices have always been well above prices on the world market. And when Danish farmers sold to countries outside the EC, the EC paid the difference.

Stocks To Be Cleared out

Now the EC can no longer cope with unrestricted agricultural subsidies. It is simply becoming too expensive to do so. Nearly three-fourths of the Community's entire budget has been swallowed up for years by the agricultural fund known as the FEOGA [European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund]. Ten days ago, the EC's agricultural ministers decided to call a halt.

The old stocks are to be cleared out. Those suitable for human consumption will be sold--at lower prices, naturally, than those the EC paid the farmers. The rest will be destroyed, and to prevent new stocks from building up again, the EC is putting a stop to unrestricted production.

Surplus stocks of dairy products (chiefly powdered milk and butter) currently total 1.3 million metric tons. The EC is now going to buy a total of 180,000 metric tons for storage at intervention prices (that is, the guaranteed EC prices). After that, there will be no more intervention purchases. Prices are naturally going to start falling, and when they drop to 92 percent of the intervention price, purchasing will resume.

But the EC is hoping that by then, the farmers will get the message and slaughter their herds.

The problem with the EC is only one of agriculture's misfortunes, says chairman Kjeldsen of the Agricultural Council. There are four in all. One of the other three is the decline of the dollar, which has harmed earnings from Danish exports (mainly canned meat and cheese) to the United States. The lower value of the dollar has also harmed earnings from exports of pork to Japan, since the cheaper dollar means that the Americans are now exporting to Japan instead of the Danes.

The third problem is the Danish Parliament's decision on the environment, which involves a tax on all fertilizers beginning in 1990. That tax will begin at 3 kroner per kilogram of fertilizer in 1990 and be doubled to 6 kroner the next year and thereafter unless Danish agriculture has reduced its fertilizer consumption from today's 400,000 metric tons per year to 250,000 metric tons.

Less Fertilizer

The use of fertilizer destroys the environment. Only half of it actually fertilizes the soil, say the politicians in Parliament, who have had the matter studied by experts. The remainder runs straight through and down into Danish streams, eventually winding up in the sea around Denmark. So the use of fertilizer is going to be restricted.

The agricultural sector is fighting with its back to the wall. Pollution of the sea around Denmark is a fact. The fishing population pointed out as far back as a few months ago that the fish and lobster were disappearing--fleeing to cleaner water--or dying. For the politicians, it is now a question of saving what they can of the fishing industry and of their voters (who otherwise will abandon the current parties and join the newly formed Green Party in large numbers) and of preserving their prestige as people with an appreciation of nature, which is currently so popular.

State subsidies are what the farmers are now calling for. The government's answer is no. Before joining the EC, direct subsidies for agriculture were an accepted fact in Denmark. The principles have changed since then. Except for specific and very limited areas such as ecological agriculture, people in Denmark today are not favorably disposed toward state subsidies. And as far as that goes, all such things are expressly banned in the EC. The fact that other EC states circumvent the ban and grant concealed agricultural subsidies in the form of tax relief or in other roundabout ways does not make things better for the Danes.

And in purely ordinary circumstances, Danish agriculture can get along without subsidies. It is because of emergency situations like the present one that the farmers are marching to Copenhagen in protest. They did it last Wednesday to tell off the politicians in Christiansborg Palace.

But that will not help much. The Social Democrats and the parties to their left have never been sworn friends of agriculture. In Schluter's nonsocialist coalition, which is in power at the moment, only the Liberal Party is pleading the farmers' cause. The entire government has promised, however, to oppose the fertilizer tax, but that will do little good: the government does not have a majority.

Some farmers have been talking about a strike, but in purely practical terms, that would not help their cause. Imports of agricultural products are completely unregulated in the EC area. The only ones who would gain from a strike are the top competitors in the agricultural area: the Dutch.

Nor have appeals to Minister of Agriculture Britta Schall-Holberg brought any help. The EC's cure is a tough one, the minister admitted when the farmers' protest march reached Christiansborg Palace. She felt sorry for the farmers.

"Sympathy doesn't help," roared the demonstrators. "What we need is money."

11798

CSO: 3650/101

HYPOTHESES ON NUCLEAR ENERGY SHARE, PROBLEMS

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 May 87 p 26

[Article by Veronique Maurus: "Nuclear Energy Will Take First Place in French Balance"]

[Text] Flexibility, competition and opening of the borders, those are the key words of the energy strategy outlined to the press on 5 May by Mr Alain Madelin, minister of industry, in presenting the report on "French Energy Prospects Approaching the Year 2000," drawn up by his services. Without overturning the energy policy "inherited" from previous governments, characterized by "the search for independence based on the development of nuclear energy," Mr Madelin stressed the uncertainties weighing on the future of energy. They make great flexibility in consumption necessary, as well as increased efforts to diversify "in order not to depend on a single source of energy or on a limited number of suppliers." To achieve that flexibility it would be advisable, according to the minister, to create "real competition" among the sources of energy which constitute "the sole means to allow the consumers to make consistent choices."

Recalling the rigidity of the French production apparatus, specifically in the nuclear area where orders already committed to point to an excess of three to seven units between now and 1990, Mr Madelin expressed the wish for the creation of a "real common energy market." Opening the borders would make it possible "to distribute the risks attached to the current uncertainties." It would specifically allow France, which has an abundant supply of electric current, to double its export balance of electricity by 1990 from 5 to 10 billion francs per year. "The free circulation of energy is in the interest of France," he concluded.

Have the experts finally become wise? The most striking aspect of the study on "The Energy Prospects of France Approaching the Year 2000," drawn up by the General Energy Directorate to once again update the estimates of the Plan (in 1983), is the extreme caution of the authors. As a matter of fact, it is rare for a forecast report to draw conclusions based primarily on the uncertainty of the future! And yet, this is the case.

It is true that, in matters of energy, the experience of the last 13 years encourages modesty. The report notes in a prologue that, without even mentioning the oil price movements, which have totally reversed the estimates, French experts in 1980 predicted electricity consumption in 1990 as 25 percent higher than the current estimates, while in 1972 others reckoned on a world energy consumption in 1985 exceeding reality by 60 percent!

The result of this uncertainty is the extreme breadth of the ranges used in the new forecasts. According to the two scenarios studied, French energy consumption expected by the year 2000 varies more than 20 percent. In one case--high price for crude (\$35 per barrel in 2000) and weak growth (1.2 to 1.5 percent per year)--it would in broad terms remain at the same level as today (see Table 1). In the other hypothesis--moderate oil price (\$20) and sustained growth (3 to 3.3 percent per year)--French consumption, on the contrary, would grow by one-fifth. The difference between the two scenarios is considerable: 40 million tons of oil equivalent, more or less, or twice the current consumption of coal, nearly the total of all nuclear consumption in 1984!

Energy source by energy source, the estimates seem hardly more precise. If the broad trends which determine the respective parts of the various energy sources are already largely known, the variation brackets are enormous here also: 30 percent for nuclear and oil energy, 69 percent for coal.


However, there are a few certainties: the first is that the share of electricity, and specifically nuclear power generated electricity, will substantially increase whatever scenario is used. In all cases, by the year 2000 nuclear power generated electricity will get ahead of oil and take the first place in the energy balance, with 39 to 42 percent of the total as against 28.5 percent today. Nevertheless, the spread between the two scenarios amounts to 23.4 million tons of oil equivalent or nearly half the current consumption.

Manage Surplus Equipment

Conversely, the share of oil drops in both scenarios, in the lower hypothesis dropping even to less than one-third of the total, as against 43 percent today. Indeed, fuel oil should be the main victim of the accelerated development of electric heating, the consumption of which should double in 15 years.

Finally, while the shares of gas and hydraulic energy should remain more or less stable, the share of coal is also very likely to fall. Hit by the closing of the thermal power stations and the decline of the steel industry, coal consumption should in any case go down in absolute value by 1990, this reduction being expected to stop only in the most optimistic scenario.

Table 1: French Energy Consumption



For the years 1990 and 2000 two hypotheses (corresponding to the two scenarios of the study) have been used for total consumption and for the specific consumption of each of the primary energy sources. The range between the two hypotheses is represented in gray. The addition of each source of energy does not correspond exactly to the total consumption because of the renewable energy sources not presented on the table, because they are still marginal, and because of the foreign trade balance in electricity.

While the uncertainties weighing on consumption remain significant, the prospects for energy supplies remain by contrast amazingly rigid. Whether we are talking about oil, where for lack of investments refineries seem condemned to import 25 percent of French needs in refined products (as against 10 to 20 percent today) and to close down one, two or three new units by the beginning of the next decade; about coal, where the regression of national production will continue at an accelerated rate to reach only 10 to 12 million tons by 1990 (as against 16.1 percent in 1986); about gas, dependent on signed supply contracts, or especially about electricity, of which it seems clear henceforth that there is surplus equipment, all the operators have an extremely limited margin to maneuver.

More even than the Plan developed 4 years ago, the DGEMP report shows the extent to which the problem faced by the French decision makers in the years to come will consist of managing the excess where in the past they expected a shortage. Whatever one may want, the energy picture will remain crushed by the weight of the nuclear problem. Taking into account the existing equipment and the orders already committed to, EDF will not be able to prevent its network of nuclear power stations from being clearly overbuilt by 1990, in spite of the lengthening of construction delays and the increase in consumption. The report estimates that "by 1990 there will be an economic excess equipment of 3 to 7 units of 1,300 megawatts," which does not mean that those reactors will remain unused but that they will not be used sufficiently to remain profitable compared to the coal fired power stations.

Two consequences: on the one hand, a "very noticeable" slowdown in nuclear orders. According to the report, for the low hypothesis no new commitments would be necessary over the next 7 years. Even with the high scenario, the optimal program would not exceed one unit every 2 years. Beyond 1994, a progressive resumption of investments would probably be necessary to replace the obsolete power stations after the year 2000. In concrete terms, taking into account the commitments made to the municipalities, it should be possible, according to the ministry's services to order only three new units between now and 1992.

On the other hand, to make the French network profitable it will be necessary to export a maximum amount of current to neighboring countries. The report foresees that the net balance of foreign trade in electricity could go from 5.6 million tons in oil equivalent in 1986 to an amount of 8.9 to 11.1 million tons by the year 2000, or an increase of 58 to 98 percent, a necessary condition to absorb the surplus! Paradox: even though on an average yearly basis France has too much current, it does run the risk of running short a few days per year, at the time of the extreme peaks of winter. As a matter of fact, the strong development of electric heating swells those peaks and unbalances the demand. To remedy this problem, the report suggests, on the one hand, the installation of gas turbines, the most economic means for very short periods of use, and on the other hand, the development of sales to industry to re-balance the demand.

In conclusion, the study stresses the risks of tensions resulting from the foreseeable inadequacy of supply and demand. The uncertain consumers of the future, taught by experience, will have the tendency more and more to resort to competition by purchasing flexible systems allowing them to shift rapidly from one energy source to another. The authors of the report stress that this increased competition between the French energy producers and the importers assumes increased efforts of competitiveness on the part of French operators. "It is under those conditions that it will be possible to pursue the progress of energy independence, which remains at the heart of the objectives of the energy policy," concludes the document. These prospects are not very rosy for the above mentioned operators...

8463

CSO: 3519/123

DESIYAB FIRMS GO PUBLIC

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Feb 87 pp 1, 11

[Text] DESIYAB (State Industry and Worker Investment Bank) continues to support arrangements aimed at a more even distribution of ownership, and towards the formation of a stock market. Legislation concerning the latter is expected quite soon. Issuing shares in companies with which it has stock ownership or credit relations, DESIYAB has recently introduced a requirement for companies in its rehabilitation program asking them to submit their balance sheets to international auditors. All 21 companies in the rehab program will have been audited by the end of June (5 of the companies are already going through the process).

As an initial measure in the rehab program DESIYAB offered shares in 4 companies to the public. And firms receiving financial support from DESIYAB will be subject to the auditing process as a condition of that support. The procedure is being put into place in gradual fashion. The idea is to monitor the activities of these firms more closely, and facilitate selling of their shares. By the end of June, 21 firms will have been through the auditing process carried out in line with international standards applying to firms whose shares are traded in stock exchanges.

Firms outside the rehab program but in which DESIYAB maintains an influence are also being audited by international auditing firms. As told by DESIYAB Deputy Director Niyazi Eroglu: "DESIYAB has assumed a pioneering role in Turkey promoting employment of private auditing firms." It is important for DESIYAB that firms with which it maintains credit and partnership relations submit to auditors which conform to international accounting rules, noted Eroglu. He then went on to say:

In deciding whether to admit firms with which we maintain credit and shareholding relations into our rehab program we brought in

the condition that they submit their balance sheets to auditing. For us auditing is an important tool to monitor activities of the firms in our rehab program. Firms not included in the rehab program but in which DESIYAB maintains an influence are also subjected to audit. 5 firms are already going through the auditing process, and their numbers are expected to reach 21 by the end of June. Firms which will be considered for the rehab program in future will also have to submit to auditing as a condition of their admittance.

DESIYAB holdings audited by international auditing firms are: Astat (bolts), Aykim (aluminum processing), Gentas Ferzalit, Gumuskale (cement paste), Zimas Zincir. And firms still to be audited: Akdag (hides and leather), Cepnigucu (animal feed), Guryem, Hisersan (kaolin enrichment), Toris (bolts), Tonya (milk), Upas (tiles), Bimtas, Uygur (motors), Abana (electrical engines), Devrektas (formica), Kestas (flour), Cetas (milk and milk products), Korusan (furniture), Yetas (furniture), Soksa (textiles).

[Please see continuation on next page]

[Advertisement]

Attention Savers!

DESIYAB

Initial Results of Our Rehab Program:
Offer of Shares in Our Newly Profitable Companies

DENIZLI GLASSWARE LTD.

Product: Household glassware
Capacity: 1,165 ton/year handmade glassware
607 ton/year manufactured glassware
Capital: TL 1.5 billion (paid-up)
Address: P.K.188 Denizli
Tel: (621) 21422-18746
Telex: 59548 DCAMTR

KOYTAS TEXTILES LTD.

Product: Coloration, printing and finishing of raw cloth
Capacity: 20,000,000 meter/year cotton cloth
Capital: TL 750,000,000 (paid-up)
Address: P.K. 48 Nazilli, Aydin
Tel: (637) 2038
Telex: 53854 BABOTR

MAKSAN - MALATYA MACHINERY LTD.

Product: Distribution transformers
Capacity: 2,656 units/year
Capital: TL 1.2 billion (paid-up)
Address: Elazig Karayolu 8 km., Malatya
Tel: (821) 12846
Telex: 66136 MMKSTR

DOGUSAN - PIPES LTD.

Product: Asbestos-reinforced cement pipes and accessories
Capacity: 25,000 ton/year ϕ 100-700 mm
2,5-17,5 Atm pressure resistant pipes (3 shifts)
Capital: TL 2.35 billion (paid-up)
Address: Sivas Karayolu 14 km - P.K. 74 Erzincan
Tel: (0231) 6199-2344-6331
Telex: 84018 DOKTR

IMPORTANT

1. Shares will be sold to individual shareholders in proportion to their existing shares not to exceed 1 percent of total capital,
2. Sales will commence on 1 Apr 87,
3. From 30 Jun 87 onwards the shares will be sold to the public at going market prices,
4. Shareholders residing abroad will purchase the shares in foreign currency.

'BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER' MODEL WINS APPROVAL

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Feb 87 pp 1, 11

[Text] The 'build-operate-transfer' (B-O-T) model is being applied in dams for the first time. Turkey is demonstrating the first instance of the model to be used in dams. Agreement in principle has been reached on the dams which are to be built in line with the B-O-T model by Dogus Yatirim - Cukurova, Soytek and Alarko. Signing is expected by week's end. Meanwhile, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) signed a preliminary agreement with Seapac regarding construction of a thermal power plant.

So far applications have been received from 55 firms to operate hydro-electric power plants, and from 3 foreign consortiums to operate thermal power plants. Projects will be financed by private financial organisations, to be operated for a period of 15 years. No state guarantees are extended to domestic firms wanting access to overseas financing. The Board of Eximbank (U.S.), meanwhile, has approved the sum of \$610 million to finance thermal plants to be commissioned to foreign consortiums within the B-O-T framework. The news of the approval has been conveyed to MENR and SPO. The \$610 million is earmarked for consortiums led by Bechtel, Seapac and Brown Boveri.

Dogus Yatirim and Cukurova Holding are jointly undertaking the project to build, operate and transfer the Aslancak Dam and hydro-electric power plant. The 90 MW dam is expected to yield 296,000 kw/hr of electricity. Costing \$100 million together with interest, the project will be financed 15 percent in pre-paid capital and 85 percent in foreign credit.

The Dogus Group is working on 4 more dams, one of them self-financed and others joint ventures with foreign firms. Proposals are expected to take another 2 months to complete, and Dogus is about to make two other B-O-T applications.

Alarko, on the other hand, is to operate the 2-unit, 14 MW Hasanlar Dam, based on the B-O-T model, financing the project 40 percent in pre-paid capital and 60 percent in credit. Alarko Holding will try to extend the duration of its incentive certificates. Meanwhile, Soytak will take charge of a 3-unit 30 MW dam, again on the B-O-T model.

The model is being implemented for the first time, after 1,5 years of negotiations, Dogus officials said. There still are some loose ends expected to be tied shortly, and agreement to be signed by the end of the week, or the beginning of next week. "This is the first time in Turkey, and the world for that matter, that an energy project is based on the B-O-T model," Dogus officials said, adding that World Bank also wants to participate in the project but with certain conditions. Developments regarding overseas financing were described by Dogus officials as follows:

A condition on which World Bank insists is 25 percent pre-paid capital. And they are prepared to provide no more than 25 percent of the total outlay. We are given a 6-month period after signing the agreement to secure foreign financing. During that period a consortium will be formed -- probably with the Japanese or the Swiss or the Yugoslavs, or all of the above. These credits will then be submitted to Undersecretary of the Treasury and External Trade (UTET) and SPO, and if approved the dam will be started. This means that the B-O-T model has been reaffirmed, and got off the ground. Agreements have been reached with numerous firms and institutions. Now the task is to gain the approval of UTET and SPO. It would be easier for us to venture into world financial markets once we have the signed-and-sealed agreement in our hand. We might yet decide to invite certain finance companies into the Aslancak project. We certainly don't want to alienate anyone at this point.

Dogus officials said they were busy working out the procedures applying to the building, operation and transfer of projects together with MENR. They added:

Both the government and firms like ourselves bear an historic responsibility. The model is untried, untested anywhere in the world. We have worked together with plenty of goodwill and produced a draft text for contracts and an operational procedure. Items still remain on which we have reservations, and that the Ministry finds difficult to accept. But given the goodwill, we expect to resolve them as well.

Private Company

Following signing of the agreement a company will be formed exclusively directed to the project under the name Aslancak Electrical Power Plant and Management Ltd. The new company will be liable to the creditors. After foreign credit is approved the project will be given the go ahead, location will be selected and land expropriated.

In line with the B-O-T model all the financing will be done privately, and the operational length will be 15 years. Energy produced will be sold at rates no more than 60-65 percent of what TEK charges on average. At the end of the 15 years the facility, having a residual life of at least 35 years, will be transferred to the public without charge.

Problem Resolved

Meanwhile, Uzeyir Garih, an Alarko director, said that a formula has been found to determine the electricity rates. The new formula, different than the one TEK uses, is conceived in such a way as to prevent unduly high profits going to the private sector. Garih said the agreement is to be signed in the next few days. Meanwhile, Dogus officials drew attention to the point that rates in hydro power plants were to be fixed at 60 percent of average TEK rates, saying:

There is something slightly askew here. Thermal power uses a depleting resource whereas hydro power is renewable. But hydro is being punished in this case though the initial investment costs in thermal plants are admittedly high. In hydro power plants we use our own national resources whereas thermal power depends upon imported coal. We will have to deal with these issues later on.

In the view of Dogus officials the ever-growing energy shortage has given birth to Law No.3096. They add that the B-O-T model carries great significance in resolving the energy shortage as well as gainfully employing the construction equipment which have been lying idle.

Credit Approved

Meanwhile, it was announced that the \$610 million credit line, earmarked for thermal plants to be built by foreign consortiums within the B-O-T framework, has been approved by the Board of Eximbank (U.S.). The decision, taken early Feb, has been conveyed to MENR and SPO. In the aftermath of a visit by the

Turkish delegation headed by Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry Ahmet Selcuk to U.S., France and Switzerland, the 'Eximbanks' of all three countries have indicated that their views on the B-O-T model were essentially favorable. They also evaluated the projects submitted by the Turkish side. The initial result of these contacts came from Eximbank (U.S.) announcing its decision to extend a \$610 million credit line to 3 separate consortiums led, respectively, by Bechtel, Seapac and Brown Boveri. Of this sum \$360 million is to go to Bechtel (U.S.), \$150 million to Brown Boveri (Swiss), and \$100 million to Seapac (Australia).

Now that the Eximbanks' support for B-O-T projects is made clear, MENR has decided to send a letter to the firms slated to build the thermal plants, demanding that they review their proposals to fit the new circumstances. Arguing that Turkey is not in a position to embark upon these projects all at once, MENR officials said they were doing this to decide which of the projects to undertake this year, adding that the other two projects will be started in coming years.

12466

CSO: 3554/199

COMMENTARY ON INDUSTRIALISTS' DISAGREEMENT WITH WORLD BANK VIEW

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 25 Feb 87 p 6

[Article by Kemal Canturk]

[Text] On many occasions we have underlined how economic life is predicated upon trust. And there is reason to suppose that the same thing applies to affairs of state. Trust has to be regarded as a positive, inherently dynamic force in society. It is imperative that the public trusts the government, employees trust managers, and students trust their teachers. Any weakening of trust is sure to erode the 'dynamism' inherent in social relationships which in time would reduce productivity in the administrative mechanism, and society would be beset by feelings of discontent. This would give rise to increased feelings of distrust permeating society and start having adverse affects on economic life. More complaints would be heard around leading to the formation of vicious circles. Such a situation would stall the functioning of the ship of state, causing widespread stagnation.

In order to avoid such a scenario the government has to listen to voices coming from all sectors of society. The extent of the government's responsiveness can be ascertained by the way complaints are handled. When the public gets the impression that the administration is responsible for existing shortcomings, and when authorities fail to demonstrate adequate concern there will be a piecemeal weakening in 'trust', in turn creating further negative economic and social consequences. In order to avoid such scenarios, major irritants in particular should be urgently dealt with. Or at the very least, the public should be informed of such grievances.

The reason behind all these musings is a news item that appeared in last Friday's issue of TERCUMAN: 'Turkey an exemplary country

in the eyes of IMF and World Bank but industrialists are furious'. It is reported that our industrialists are unhappy about following issues:

- Serious shortcomings exist in the mechanism of export incentives (basically arising out of two major factors). This might lead to a foreign exchange shortage,
- Price rises in SEE-produced goods are often disproportionate, bringing added burdens to the economy,
- In the cotton-based textile industry there are problems at the level of raw materials yet to be solved,
- In decisions affecting the economy the private sector is not given a sufficient hearing to air its grievances.

At this point we don't intend to dwell on how justified the grievances are. Because we don't know what goes on inside. But we would like to point out that the government would be well-advised to pay urgent heed to such grievances. If prompt responses are given to expressed grievances, and if the public is reassured that necessary measures are being taken, and if they are relieved of misconstrued perceptions then crises of confidence and the undesirable consequences of a loss of trust in the government would thereby be avoided.

12466

CSO: 3554/204

OBJECTIONS TO PENAL CODE DRAFT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Feb 87 p 7

[Interview with Professor Cetin Ozek by correspondent Ali Sirmen; date and place unspecified]

[Text] The debate over the Penal Code draft bill was ended before it even started. It was quite obvious that a comprehensive examination was needed of a draft bill which has lot of drawbacks and which disagrees with current conceptions of criminal law. There was also a need to establish a commission to pull the threads together, evaluate the criticisms and offer guidance to the legislators. One would have anticipated that opposition parties, SPP for instance, would establish a party commission to look into these issues.

We talked to Professor Cetin Ozek for his overall assessment of the bill, to have him analyze its conceptual basis and explain, from a constitutional and criminal law perspective, what the new offences cited in the bill entail.

As we present Prof. Ozek's views here we consider it our duty to re-issue our call to the government, the opposition parties, bar associations and The Union of Bar Associations, to establish a commission as soon as possible to evaluate these criticisms and views.

[Question] Mr. Ozek, can you make an overall assessment of the new Penal Code draft bill?

[Answer] There have been several attempts to change our penal code. As before, the argument is made that this an 'indigenous', 'brand new', and 'up-to-date' penal code. In actual fact, this is nothing but a rehashed version of the existing penal code. What they have done is turn the same old thing inside out, keeping the basic structure as well as the existing classification of offences largely intact while introducing some minor, peripheral rules and regulations. And these rules can be found, in their entirety, in 'Theoretical and Practical Criminal Law' authored by Donmezer and Erman. All this amounts to an official sanctioning of the views enunciated

in that book which derives a good deal of its inspiration from the 1930 Italian Penal Code.

The way the commission (that prepared the draft bill) is composed does not leave much room for an exchange of different views existing in scholarly circles. It seems that the dominant views and political dispositions in the commission have prevailed, making their imprint on crucial aspects of the draft bill. One can, therefore, say that the bill has been prepared without an adequate exposition of the technicalities of criminal law as well as political questions concerning individual freedoms. The bill's approach to issues such as 'individual freedoms', 'protection of the state', 'political offense', 'intellectual offense' and 'international relations' indicates that it was the authoritarian, punitive and stern approach, incompatible with democratic and contemporary norms, that prevailed in the commission.

[Question] But it is said that the draft bill has reduced the sentences...

[Answer] It is true to say that the majority of the sentences are reduced, and an overall restructuring of penal measures are being considered. And in the preamble of the bill there is an acknowledgement that heavier sentences will not reduce the incidence of crime. I agree with that. I also happen to believe that sentences are exceptionally heavy and they ought to be reduced. But if we want to be consistent with ourselves, and to be scientific, and make good our claim that we are acting in accordance with the principles of democratic life, then we have to acknowledge that in our day there is no place for the concept of 'intellectual offense', and sentences for 'crimes against the state' are too harsh. Any draft bill should have been prepared with these in mind. The sentences and classification of political offences mentioned in the bill take us back to the Mussolini era, despite the reduction of the sentences. This is a contradiction. It also means that objectivity has been abandoned and punitive measures are employed as a means to secure political obedience. This is highly inconsistent with democratic principles. We might like to see ourselves as 'contemporary', as claimed in the preamble of the bill, but we would only be exposing our contradictions. In particular, if we expand the scope of the crimes against the state, increasing their sentences, while reducing sentences of the crimes for which NAP insurgents were tried and convicted, narrowing the scope of clauses that apply to them, and exempting those clauses from the 'no amnesty' provision of Article 14 of the Constitution, can we still maintain that such an attitude, which is not explainable in scientific terms, is objective, bipartisan and contemporary?

[Question] Can you elaborate further on the concept of the 'protection of the state'?

[Answer] The existence of a state, whatever its political form, is protected by penal codes. But the rules protecting the state are fashioned according to the political principles the state is based upon. But if there is no consistency between the political form of the state, its constitutional structure and penal norms it would follow that there is no agreement between its format, principles and rules. For instance, if we talk about a 'democratic state of laws' and then introduce the kind of legal arrangements that would stifle the essence of individual freedoms, all in the name of protecting the state, it would be a democracy in name only. The name democracy can only be assigned to those political formations which are pluralist, geared to compromise and open to change. They also would have to offer constitutional guarantees for individual rights and freedoms, including the freedom to declare one's opinion. In actual fact, a constitution becomes democratic not by protecting the state against the individual but when it protects the individual against possible abuse of power by the government, and when it guarantees individual freedoms.

Our 1961 Constitution had that quality. Article 11 of the 1961 Constitution was designed to guarantee individual freedoms by limiting the powers of the government. Freedom of ideas was limitless. But its implementation and specific legal arrangements was not in keeping with its letter and intent. In no way could there be any compatibility between that constitution and 'intellectual offences' elucidated in Articles 141, 142, and 163, and their widespread application. The 1982 Constitution, which is the product of 12 Sep military coup, is altogether different. Whereas the 61 Constitution talks about 'protection of fundamental rights' in Article 10, Articles 13 and 14 of the 82 Constitution talks about 'limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms, preventing their abuse' and so on. In other words, while the aim of the 61 Constitution is protection of freedoms, the 82 Constitution is concerned with limiting freedoms.

[Question] Well, how is the balance between security of the state and individual freedoms attained in modern democracies?

[Answer] In our day the 'gendarmierie state', which is accountable to no one, has been replaced by the 'democratic social state' which guarantees the rights and freedoms of individuals as well as providing a decent living for them. Freedom is no longer understood as a relationship at an individual level but as a relation between the individual and the government. It has become a concept defining the scope of individual action and its preservation. Within the framework of this understanding the individual has to behave within the norms and try to effect changes in the governmental system through constitutional means. The government on the other hand has a responsibility for providing individuals with conditions for exercising their rights and securing their freedoms. It is for

this reason that we talk of limited government -- limited in the sense that it is not allowed to interfere with basic individual freedoms, particularly when making legal arrangements concerning those rights and freedoms. In democracies, the individual does not have to 'think' in accordance with the constitutional order but has to behave accordingly. That is how the balance is established.

[Question] How does the new draft bill handle the concept of protection of the state?

[Answer] The bill is quite consistent with the present constitutional/legal framework. Indeed, in the preamble itself, the 1889 Italian Penal Code is criticized as being inadequate regarding the 'protection of the state'. (The 1889 Code, a product and expression of 19th century liberalism, is the forerunner of our own penal code.) And without referring to it by name, the preamble looks on with favor to fascist practices between the two world wars. The point is made in the draft bill that 'in the instance that individual freedoms clash with preservation of the fundamental principles of the state and social values society's defense should not be neglected'. It thus articulates a logic inconsistent with the concept of democratic balance. Creating 'obstruction of justice' crimes, designating perceived threat as crime, all in the interests of defending society, and proliferating 'intellectual offenses'... These are products of a mentality which seeks to establish 'balance' by sacrificing individual freedoms. In the same vein, the 'strict' interpretation of the 'legality in the crime' rule, which otherwise constitutes a guarantee of individual security, has now been abandoned, and the scope for arbitrary judgement has been widened.

Despite the fact that in our country the 'legality in the crime' rule is applied with an almost excessive strictness, ambiguity in defining crimes makes it possible for every individual to be charged with a crime, and punished for his beliefs at any given moment. Therefore, it doesn't take much to see that increasing the flexibility of 'legality in the crime' rule can only expand the scope of criminal liability. Particularly when the proliferation of 'perceived threat crimes' coincides with relaxation of the 'legality of the crime' rule, individual freedoms are likely to go by the wayside. When it is considered how extensive is the authority our constitutional legal system grants to the administrative branch, the introduction of the penal code as envisioned in the draft bill, will mean that the cost of the state's protection will be the erosion of individual freedoms.

[Question] And what about the rules pertaining to political offences?

[Answer] The bill's handling of crimes committed in other countries are also indicative of how biased and subjective the commission has been in their approach to the whole question of political offences. Even when they make a distinction between political and other offences they clearly exhibit disfavor for political offences. This is demonstrated in the way political offences committed outside the country become eligible for re-trial in Turkey even if there has already been a trial and conviction. Hence, they are denied the rule of 'benefiting from the more lenient penal code'. In fact the bill designates political offenders as 'specially dangerous political offenders', thus making them susceptible to 'security measures' on top of any sentence they might receive. And 'specially dangerous political offenders' are considered as 'habitual offenders' and security measures taken in this case are designated as 'rehabilitation under supervision'. One should also point out that measures relating to 'specially dangerous political offenders' who are considered 'politically organized offenders' are left to the judge to decide. And when it is recalled that the manner in which these security measures are to be applied is determined by a regulatory code which will come out in the future, it is quite obvious that the political offender is left at the mercy of the government of the day.

The bill has not overlooked foreigners either in its designation of political offenders as the enemy. A foreigner who commits an offense against the Turkish state, whatever his sentence, can be re-tried in Turkey without requiring any involvement on the part of the minister of justice. Even if he has been acquitted in his own country he could still be re-tried in Turkey. In short, the system creates dangers for foreigners who are blissfully unaware of the unique and unprecedented categories of crime specified in the draft bill. The expression, so favored by the supporters of Articles 141, 142, and 163, "There is no freedom to destroy freedom," is often used as rationale for punishing acts reflecting the 'clear and present danger'. But an idea, in itself, cannot be considered as 'dangerous'. So how can it be viewed as 'destroying freedom'? Deciding to allow free speech according to the content of ideas, prohibiting certain ideas from being expressed and giving privileged status to officially legitimated ideas are practices favored by fascist systems which require uniform thinking from everyone.

Let me emphasize one point: Those who don't mind the existence of such a thing as 'intellectual offense' resort to an ingenuous device. Ministers of justice and those who are afraid of free thinking are defending views incompatible with the contemporary concept of democracy and the scientific approach. They say things like, "Since Article 141, 142 and 163 outlaw propaganda it means that propaganda cannot be considered within the category of intellectual offenses." What they fail to understand is that when you prohibit expression of ideas by a code you cannot then point to the legality of the process to say

there is no attribution of intellectual offense. They fail to see that the very concept of intellectual offense is incompatible with democratic principles. And, in the face of such blatant contortions of logic, all we can do is to grin and bear it. Even more saddening is the sight of eminent jurists ruling that 'propaganda is an insurgent act', and that Articles 141, 142, 163 should not necessarily entail the concept of intellectual offense. And to think that they also claim to, be 'contemporary'...

In modern democracies freedom of thought covers expression of ideas as well as their 'propaganda'. Unless expression is permitted we can't talk of freedom of ideas. It is for this reason that in democracies freedom of expression is explicitly defined delineated. Expression of an idea and making propaganda with a view to association is not an insurgent act. An insurgent act is a tangible, illegal, act designed to bring about changes in the state of the world. Expression of ideas, propaganda and association, on the other hand, are inalienable rights in democratic life. It is a condition of democracy to have these rights, therefore they cannot be against the law. What is against the law is the provocation and mobilization of the masses, in ways contravening constitutional procedures, by means of force, in order to overturn the constitutional system. It is only in such an eventuality that we can rightly refer to an insurgent act, and we can consider such individuals as having engaged in anti-constitutional behavior. The 'threat' arises only at this point. I would like to emphasize that in a country where the concept of 'intellectual crime' is accepted we cannot talk of the existence of democracy.

[Question] What measures are there in the draft bill relating to protection of the Constitution?

[Answer] Articles 141, 142 and 163 address the 'danger' of the Constitution being forcefully changed, and associate 'intellectual crime' with that danger. Even if no tangible act is committed any 'expression of ideas' which is aimed to changing the fundamental nature of the Constitution and its underlying ideology is deemed to be an offence under Articles 141, 142, 163. Thus a connection is established between 'intellectual offense' and 'violation of the Constitution'. In this sequence, violation of the Constitution is the final act, whereas the intellectual offense is a 'preliminary move leading to the final act'. Since changing the Constitution by due process is not a crime, the element of 'force' has to be present to make it a crime. The idea of changing the Constitution would have to be accompanied by unconstitutional methods in order to be deemed an offense. But the bill does not insist on 'force' to be present. As such, trying to change the Constitution by constitutional means is not regarded unlawful but expressing views on the issue is regarded as such. In the preamble, it is mentioned that the concept of intellectual offense is consistent

with the Constitution. But since expressing ideas relating to constitutional change, as well as forming political parties to that end is deemed unlawful, changing the Constitution even by constitutional means is disallowed under threat of punitive sanctions.

[Question] What are the changes envisioned in the bill with regard to Articles 141, 142 and 163?

[Answer] The concept of 'intellectual offense' is alive and well. It may have been too much to expect a truly democratic penal code to emerge in this political climate which can hardly be called democratic in the contemporary sense, and given the current constitutional/legal context. Neither the overall political climate nor the composition of the commission was expected to be conducive to getting rid of the concept of 'intellectual offense', or insisting that the element of force be present. It was an empty hope. As it is, the bill retains the Articles (141, 142, 163) and has even expanded their scope.

In the actual text of the Articles 141 and 142 there is a requirement that acts of 'propaganda' and 'association' be committed 'with a view to' bringing about ends that are considered unlawful. This means it has to be demonstrated that the offender engaged in such acts with 'deliberate intent' to bring about the unlawful result. In the bill, however, the term 'with a view to' has been replaced by 'for'. This creates a situation whereby a person, whatever his intention, may be criminally liable for an end result that is out of his control but may yet be traced to his expressing ideas, or associating with others. This is common practice in any case but now they giving it formal recognition and limiting freedom of thought even further. The concept of the 'negation of existing legal norms', so favored by some of our 'eminent' jurists, is now being formalized. Expansion of the scope of criminal liability applies to Article 163 as well. In cases of religious propaganda and association, the 'violation of secularism' is no longer demanded as a condition of criminal liability. Thus leaving the doors open for laying criminal charges against expression of religious ideas which do not entail any intent to overturn the present secular order.

The preamble makes reference to the freedom to engage in scientific. In the bill, however, there is a suggestion that acts of 'propaganda and association' may be committed behind the facade of scientific activity. Whether or not that is the case is left to be determined by a judge. Thus scientific freedom is also curtailed and a distinction is made between 'established science and non-established science'.

[Question] What does the bill say about protecting the government and the National Assembly?

[Answer] Articles 319 and 320 of the bill designate the removal of the Assembly or the government, or obstructing discharge of their duties 'by means other than permitted under the Constitution' as a crime. Similar clauses exist in our present code as well. But how can it be determined whether it is 'contrary to constitutional procedure' when acceptable procedures to abolish the Assembly or the government have not been spelled out in the Constitution? There is an implicit suggestion in the text that there are procedures agreeable to the Constitution for removing the Assembly or the government from the scene. What is 'lawful procedure' in this regard? It may well be that drafters of the bill consider their abolition provided it is done in accordance with the 'Institutional Code' of the Army as constitutionally acceptable procedure. Maybe they view the recent happenings in our history as some form of 'constitutional tradition' and want to demonstrate that the same procedures would be considered lawful.

[Question] What does the bill say about security of the individual?

[Answer] The bill, consistent with the constitutional/legal framework, puts security of the individual into danger. In a country where democracy is not fully functioning at the best of times even granting more flexibility to the 'legality in the crime' rule can have adverse impact on individual security. In particular, the section on 'crimes against the state' is full of traps. To give another example, under clauses 150 and 151 listening to conversations between individuals and recording are viewed unlawful. An appropriate stance. However, if such acts are committed in emergency situations by officials getting their orders from a 'legally designated authority' they are considered lawful, as specified in clause 154. Thus, without judicial decision or guarantee, it becomes lawful to invade the privacy of the individual, secretly listen to his conversations, record them, and film his activities. Evidence so derived, though it goes against the Declaration of Human Rights, is viewed as acceptable evidence in court. Can we still maintain individual security exists, and the individual is safe vis-a-vis the government? Can we still consider such a political formation democratic when we see such illegalities being formalized? Can we call this bill contemporary and democratic?

[Question] How does the bill handle the issue of freedom of the press?

[Answer] Intellectual offenses are usually committed through the press. This means that the proliferation of such offenses and expansion of their scope leads to further limitations in the 'expression of ideas through the press', and erosion of whatever freedoms are left in this area. Terms like, 'divulging state secrets', 'classified information', 'information banned by the authorities', 'information to remain secret for national

security purposes', by their very ambiguity place the press under threat of punitive sanction on a continual basis. The new bill is replete with such terms. Furthermore, clause 346 of the new bill creates an entirely new category of offense, designating certain Cabinet proceedings, not made public for reasons of state and/or political exigencies, as classified information. Publication of such Cabinet proceedings are to be treated as close to espionage and divulging state secrets.

Clause 305 of the bill also creates a new type of offense, a sentence of up to 6 years for 'tarnishing the economic reputation of the country', for spreading 'untrue stories' that might bring about the undoing of economic agreements. When such ambiguous definition of what constitutes an offense combines with relaxation of the 'legality in the crime' rule one doesn't have to be a fortune teller to realize what will become of freedom of the press. Not to mention that what is an 'untrue story', what is 'classified information', 'banned information', or 'harmful to national interest' will be determined by the government of the day. The government is thus usurping authority that rightfully belongs to the judiciary -- a short step away from abolishing with the freedom of the press altogether. As new categories of offense chip away at the public's right to acquire information it will also reduce the likelihood of having a well-informed public opinion and a healthy exercise of one's political options. Perhaps that is what they really want under the label of democracy.

[Question] Then there is the question of arbitration, isn't there?

[Answer] Clause 396 of the bill creates an interesting offense category. Under this clause it becomes an offense for the arbitrator to give an 'opinion' which contravenes the facts. There was a similar rule in the 1930 Italian Penal Code but certain conditions had to be satisfied to declare an offense, conditions which are not mentioned in the bill. Resorting to arbitration in intellectual offense cases is a widespread practice in Turkey. We also know that different arbitrators issue different opinions. Since the truth has to be one and only, and since arbitrators often issue contradictory opinions, at least one of them has to be contravening the facts. We might recall that in certain instances sentences given on the basis of arbitration reports are overturned by the Court of Cassation. It follows that clause 396 could be invoked against an arbitrator because he either unknowingly contravenes the facts, in which case he is not qualified to arbitrate, or he issues his opinion colored by political disposition, in which case it becomes an offense. Therefore, those who have made a career out of issuing arbitration reports based upon with their political dispositions should better read clause 396 very carefully.

[Question] If and when the bill goes into effect will it be easier or harder to join Europe?

[Answer] That our constitutional and legal system is in contradiction with democratic principles often leads to Turkey's exclusion by Western democracies. For them even economic integration is conditional upon political compatibility. Thus opposition to our membership in the EEC and withholding implementation of the 'free circulation agreement' are due partly to political reasons and not merely economic ones. If the bill becomes law Turkey would be excluded by Western democracies to a greater extent.

I should draw attention to a related aspect, that of clauses 437 and 438, which divide the world into two sets of countries -- 'friend and foe'. Clause 437 asserts that an act committed against Turkey's 'military allies' will be treated as if they were committed against Turkey itself. These include helping the enemies of those countries, provoking their soldiers into disobedience, inciting them against military service, divulging state secrets. And clause 438 stipulates that offering help to and conducting espionage on behalf of countries maintaining a 'military alliance with an enemy state' will be treated as if the offense was committed against Turkey. It means that the countries belonging to other alliances than the one Turkey belongs are automatically designated as foe. Declaring a 'state of war' is apparently no longer necessary for such a purpose. The preamble of the bill declares that any act committed against an ally would be considered as having been committed against Turkey. To give an example, it is not a crime to publish in American newspapers that the U.S. has been supporting the guerillas in Nicaragua with money coming from secret arms sales to Iran. But if a Turkish journalist uncovers the story and publishes it in Turkey it becomes an offense. We would be wrong in thinking that with such an (more-monarchist-than-the-king-himself) attitude, and ignoring developments in the world, dividing countries into friend and foe in such an uncompromising way we would ingratiate ourselves with the West. But I believe Western democracies would be among the first to reject such an attitude.

[Question] You say this bill is consistent with the spirit of the 82 Constitution. But aren't there any aspects that even the 82 Constitution might have a hard time swallowing?

[Answer] In my view this bill, with its overall approach and constraint over freedoms, is inconsistent even with the 82 Constitution. I can cite two examples. Article 38 of the Constitution requires that punitive measures are determined by legislation. The bill, however, issues a list of measures and offenses to which they correspond, leaving the substance and conditions of their implementation to be decided by regulatory code. A most important aspect of punitive measures is the way

they are implemented. If they are fashioned by regulatory codes it means that they are determined by legislation, and that is inconsistent with the 'legality' principle of the Constitution.

Another example: According to Article 15 of the Constitution the president can be charged with treason. Whether an act committed by the president is treason or not is determined (by precedent and constitutional requirement) by the legislature. In other words, the Assembly might decide that an act committed by the president, (exerting influence on the judiciary, for instance) is treasonous. Despite this clear constitutional intent, the bill puts all 'acts of treason' under one heading limiting their scope. It would be inconceivable for the president to commit the acts classified as treason in the bill, such as undermining country's unity. When 'treason' is confined to such acts, all other acts are left outside the recourse of the legislative body. For instance, if the president joins certain armed forces, attempting to get rid of the Constitution or the Assembly or the government he cannot be held responsible because such acts are not included in the 'treason' list. Thus we witness a situation whereby constitutional change is effected by means of the penal code. I don't know whether this is a constitutionally acceptable procedure or not.

[Question] Do you see the bill becoming law?

[Answer] The prime minister has recently been heard saying something like, "The state is not our father. When the state becomes our father freedoms are constrained. Until now the nation has existed for the state. From now on, however, we should see to it that the state exists for the nation." If the prime minister is sincere in those words, and if he wishes to be consistent with himself, this bill should not be made into law. And if a new penal code is necessary we should wait until such time when our democracy is fully established and the state starts existing for the nation.

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CSO: 3554/206

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS CHAIRMANSHIP ON HEADCOVER ISSUE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Jan 87 p 9

[Hilmi Bengi report]

[Text] Ankara--The turban issue, one of the major controversies in recent times, assumed a new dimension when Motherland Party deputy leader Mehmet Kececiler said: "The Religious Affairs Chairmanship must make a decision on this issue." Officials of the Religious Affairs Chairmanship have declared: "The Higher Council on Religious Affairs has already ruled on this issue; there is no need for a new decision." A decision on "headcovers" taken by the Higher Council on Religious Affairs in 1980 stated that covering one's head is a religious requirement which does not conflict with Ataturk's principles and secularism. Stating that interfering with citizens' conscience would cause resentment, the decision said: "If this repression comes from the state, relations between the state and the people would be adversely affected."

The 7-page decision (dated 30 December 1980 and reference numbered 77) by the Higher Council on Religious Affairs was taken in response to a letter by the Ministry of National Education to then Minister of State Mehmet Ozgunes with regard to the dress code of female students attending Islamic preacher schools. The decision incorporated the results of an extensive research on headcovers.

Noting that the covering of the head is mandated by Verse 31 of the Sura of Light of the Holy Koran, the decision said:

"The Almighty God has decreed by this illustrious verse that Muslim women should set their headcovers over their collars such that they cover their hair, heads, ears, necks and throats. Verse 59 of the Sura of Communities decrees that outside their homes Muslim women should wear loose dresses which do not reveal features of their bodies and that they should not go out into the street in the dresses they wear at home. All these holy verses concur that Muslim women should cover all parts of their bodies except their hands, faces and feet during prayers and in the presence of unfamiliar men who are eligible for marriage."

Islamic Decree

Stating that religion is not just a system of faith and that adherents of a religion have to comply with commandments and prohibitions with regard to manner of worship, religious practice and moral behavior, the Higher Council on Religious Affairs decision said: "The Muslim women's practice of covering their heads is not a custom or symbolism that a certain group invented later on as some circles claim, but a requirement of Islamic religion."

Curtailement of Freedom

The decision, taken 6 years ago, was signed by Higher Council on Religious Affairs Chairman Ahmet Hamdi Kasaboglu, Deputy Chairman Recep Akakus and members Ibrahim Atay, Dr Ali Arslan Aydin, Dr Ahmet Baltaci, Hasan Ege, Kemal Guran, Yakup Iskender, Mehmet Kaymakci and Irfan Yucel. The decision noted that barring women from covering their heads should be considered as much a violation of human rights and freedoms as forcing women to cover their heads. The decision said:

Human Rights

"In countries which respect human rights and which are governed by democratic regimes, the principle of secularism is one of the basic tenets of government. Secularism is also one of our government's basic tenets. A natural consequence of this principle is that compliance with religious regulations should not be mandatory in the government. Another natural consequence of secularism is that the government should respect the religious beliefs and opinions of individuals, that it should not repress them and that it should grant them full freedom of religion and conscience. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights endorsed on 10 December 1948 says:

"'All individuals have a right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change one's religion and opinions and freedom to express one's religion or opinions individually or collectively, in public or in private through teaching, practicing, worshipping and conducting religious rites.'"

Noting that the UN Human Rights Declaration which has been signed by Turkey also calls for freedom of religion and conscience, the decision by the Higher Council on Religious Affairs said:

"Any repression of citizens' beliefs would be received with resentment. If this repression comes from the state, relations between the state and the people would be adversely affected."

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CSO: 3554/203

UNIVERSITY DRESS CODE RETAINS HEADCOVER BAN

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Jan 87 pp 1,8

[Text] Changes in the YOK [Higher Education Council] Disciplinary Code became effective yesterday after being published in the Official Gazette. Although the code does not mention turbans explicitly, it requires students "to wear contemporary dresses and to maintain a contemporary appearance" in schools. The code stipulates that otherwise the students will first receive an admonition notice and may be punished with suspension if they resist.

In a press conference in Adana, the President of YOK, Professor Ihsan Dogramaci, defined the term "contemporary dress" in the code as follows:

"Heads must be open; long skirts cannot be worn; beards may be worn on condition that they do not project an ideological image; they must be contemporary."

Noting that the universities are autonomous organizations and that consequently they can interpret the term "contemporary dress" as they see fit, Dogramaci said that if complaints are received the practices of the universities may be investigated. In response to a question on whether any messages have been conveyed to university presidents following the publication of President Kenan Evren's and his own views and in view of university president appointments to be made in July, Dogramaci said: "The President will appoint the university presidents from among the four candidates we nominate."

Stating that the universities will have to make their own decisions on the turban issue, Dogramaci said that "YOK will not suggest particular actions." Dogramaci added that the publication of the dress code provision of the Student Disciplinary Code in the Official Gazette with a delay of 2 weeks is "normal." Stating that he does not think that the government deliberately delayed action on this issue, Dogramaci reiterated that YOK will not interfere in the universities' freedom of action in the area of dress or any other area and said: "The turban issue is definitely not on our agenda, but it may have been discussed in the halls."

The reporters asked: "What is contemporary dress in your opinion? Is the turban contemporary? How will this be implemented?" Dogramaci replied: "In Europe and America they have head garments which do not cover the hair. I have seen them. My wife wears a turban at home and outside but her hair are visible." Pointing to a beret worn by a lady reporter, Dogramaci described it as "contemporary."

Another reporter asked: "But what is your definition?" Dogramaci replied: "If a head garment is elegant and does not cover the hair, then I would call it contemporary." In reply to another question, Dogramaci said that he does not know whether Minister of State Ahmet Karaevli's wife wears a "contemporary turban" because he has "not seen her." He added: "The students' heads must be uncovered; long skirts will not be permitted."

Dogramaci added that this is his own view. Stating that the universities may permit the wearing of berets "if they consider them to be contemporary," the YOK President said: "We will oversee the implementation of the universities. We have an oversight organ. We will oversee to what extent the code is implemented."

Dogramaci was asked: "What will you do if a student wears a headcover and the university administration considers it contemporary?" Stating that his organization can oversee the implementation of the code through normal channels and through complaints, Dogramaci said: "YOK will make a decision on the basis of the reports received. If necessary the university may be investigated."

Noting that YOK cannot issue any directives on implementation and that, however, the government may propose and the Assembly may enact laws on this issue, Dogramaci was asked: "What are we going to tell the people? Are headcovers and turbans banned or not?" Dogramaci replied:

"Headcovers and turbans are neither banned nor not banned. We are requiring contemporary dress and appearance. It was the press, not we, who created the turban issue. You should ask that question to the press. Then there is the question of the beard. Students can naturally grow bear . But if 20 students get together and decide on a certain form of beard to symbolize a certain viewpoint and ideology, then you must concede that that is not contemporary.

"The university should discourage that. This is my own view. However, universities are autonomous organizations. They do not receive directives from us. They interpret and implement existing laws and regulations. We just oversee them."

Published in Official Gazette

The supplementary article on dress appended to Article 7--entitled "Offenses Warranting Admonition"--of the YOK Disciplinary Code which appeared in the 13 January 1985 edition of the Official Gazette was published in the Official

Gazette yesterday. According to this article, students are required "to wear contemporary dress and to maintain a contemporary appearance in classrooms, laboratories, clinics, polyclinics and halls of institutions of higher learning." A student not complying with this requirement will receive an admonition. In the event the violation is repeated the student may be suspended from school for 1 week to 1 month.

The said article does not specify what contemporary dress and appearance is and what would constitute a violation. According to YOK, university presidents will be free to interpret and implement the code as they see fit.

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STUDENT BOYCOTT TO PROTEST DRESS CODE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 25 Feb 87 p 3

[Fikret Helvacioğlu report]

[Text] Students resumed their boycott of classes in universities following the enforcement of the dress code regulations and the suspension of turbaned students.

A group of students at Yildiz University refused to enter classes after eight students received punishments ranging from admonition notices to 15 days to 6 months of suspension from school for wearing turbans in classes. While the turbaned students declared that they will not take off their turbans regardless of the severity of their punishment, male students who are boycotting classes charged that the dress code regulations are being enforced most strictly at Yildiz University.

The students who are protesting the suspension of their turbaned colleagues said that in contrast to other schools where turbaned students are first served an admonition notice and then suspended, at Yildiz University the admonition notice and the 15-day suspension penalty are given simultaneously. The students added that one student named Ayse Bayram was suspended from school for 6 months.

We queried Yildiz University President Suha Toner about the students' charge that the strictest form of the regulation is being implemented at Yildiz University. Toner described the boycott of the classes as just an excuse and said that the dress code regulations must be enforced effectively and expeditiously. He added:

"The implementation of the code cannot be criticized. The code is either enforced or it is not. It is said that in other schools commissions will be formed and collective penalties will be prescribed. Firstly, the implementation must begin at the start of the academic year. If something is going to be done, then there is no sense in prolonging it. What they call harsh is that we are implementing the code without delay. Whether they enter classes is their problem."

Eight students have been penalized at Yildiz University where announcements regarding the modern dress code have been posted in the halls. The university's secretary general, M. Ali Ozsari disclosed that four of the students were given admonition notices, three were suspended from school for 15 days, and one was suspended for 6 months. Meanwhile the students stated that they can prove that seven students were suspended for 15 days.

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TURBANED STUDENTS ATTEND CLASSES AT AEGEAN UNIVERSITY

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 25 Feb 87 pp 3,7

[Nebil Ozgenturk report]

[Text] Izmir--The decision to "ban turbans" taken by YOK [Higher Education Council] at the directive of President Kenan Evren returned to the public agenda with the reopening of schools. Turbaned students can still be found in some schools of the Aegean University.

The photograph taken in the halls of the School of Medicine of the Aegean University shows how well the YOK decision is being implemented. Turbaned female students carrying textbooks and wearing stethoscopes around their necks are not complying with the ban. Fifth-year medical students, who are the "doctors of the future," are still insisting that the said decision is unfair.

When they noticed that their picture was being taken, the female students at the School of Medicine at the Aegean University shouted at the reporters: "Leave us alone. What more do you want from us? We cannot come with our heads open. Of course we will wear headcovers."

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CSO: 3554/202

GROWTH OF ISLAMIC SCHOOLS SEEN AS ROOT OF TURBAN CONTROVERSY

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 8 Jan 87 p 19

[Text] Everyone from President Kenan Evren down to the man in the street has been talking about the "turban" in recent days. The issue of whether university students can wear turbans has become one of the country's leading problems. Some citizens are asking:

"Where did this turban issue originate from?"

A study conducted by the HURRIYET Research Service suggests that the turban issue is not a problem that cropped up overnight but that it is the result of a long sequence of events.

Experts believe that one of the underlying causes of the turban controversy is the reemergence of a dichotomy in the educational system--which was unified by Ataturk's Instructional Uniformity Law--with the spread of the Islamic preacher schools. The experts say: "Children who attend Islamic preacher schools and Koranic courses learn to cover their heads and their bodies. We must not be surprised when they insist on covering themselves and setting an example for others when they start attending universities."

All Islamic theological schools were shut down on 3 March 1924 as required by the Instructional Uniformity Law and were replaced with 26 Islamic preacher schools to train clerics. When the government cut financial aid to these schools in 1930-1931, these schools were also closed.

After the transition to the multiparty system, the training of clerics regained importance during the Menderes period, partly out of political motivations. In 1950-1951, seven Islamic preacher schools were opened in seven provinces. Academically, these institutions were at the elementary school level.

In the 1960's these schools were upgraded to the middle school level. Beginning in 1965, their numbers also started growing rapidly. In 1979, there were 588 such schools with 178,013 students compared to 19 schools with 4,200 students in 1961.

In the process, Islamic preacher schools became academically equivalent to conventional lycees. Starting in 1976, these schools began conferring on their graduates certificates equivalent to "lycee diplomas," and their graduates became eligible to enter all departments of universities including medical schools. As a result Islamic preacher schools became more desirable. Eventually, the number of students attending Islamic preacher schools grew to half the number of conventional lycee students. Having grown rapidly in number under the National Front governments, the Islamic preacher schools experienced a new resurgence after the 12 September military intervention. By 1983, the number of such schools had grown to 715 and the number of their students had surged to 220,000. In 1985, the number of schools rose to 716 and the number of students increased to 228,973. In comparison, in 1985 there were 1,221 lycees with 538,727 students. In the meantime, other forms of government-sponsored Islamic education were also spreading. The number of Koranic courses reached 2,000 [in 1985].

As a result of these developments, Islamic preacher schools stopped being institutions solely dedicated to the training of clerics and became institutions preparing students for university education. As a result, the proportion of female students attending such schools also grew. Virtually all these female students covered their heads.

In theory, the dress code required in Islamic preacher schools was the same as that implemented in the lycees, and accordingly the students were barred from covering themselves in the schools. However, having been taught the importance of religious obligations and "veiling" in their classes, the students wanted to cover themselves. Moreover, such attitudes were received with approval among the students' parents and were in fact encouraged. The children covered themselves on their way from home to school and uncovered themselves on entering the school grounds. They were officially allowed to cover their heads only during Koran classes.

The requirement that students uncover their heads while in school grounds was not fully enforced in some schools, while others objected to it. This situation was occasionally protested in Islamic publications. Female students said that they were impatiently waiting for the day they could attend university where they could freely cover their heads.

Professor Ilter Turan, a faculty member of the School of Political Sciences of the Istanbul University, says: "The spread of the turban is primarily the result of the spread of religion-oriented middle education."

Stating that Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya might also have played a role in this development, Professor Turan says:

"I believe that the primary reasons for the sudden upsurge of the turban controversy are the following: After 1980, there was an increase both in the number of universities and in the enrollment of existing universities. The growth in higher educational capacity opened the doors of higher education to

social segments which previously had no access to university education. Moreover, after 1980, some ideologies were found objectionable and barred, while others were given a free rein. The religious segment is apparently trying to recruit supporters in universities."

A Bosphorus University faculty member says: "After 12 September, it was thought that if students were trained as religious citizens they would not be swayed so easily by extremist movements and thus religion was promoted. But now this entire program has gone out of control."

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READER SEES HEADCOVER BAN AS RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Feb 87 p 2

[Letter to "Readers' Forum": "To Those Who Oppose Headcovers"]

[Text] Any citizen who knows this great nation and the Muslim Turkish woman who has brought it up cannot insult the sacred mother of the nation and her headcover if he carries any "noble Turkish blood" in his veins.

The mothers and sisters of all Turkish soldiers, from the most senior commanders to the lowest-ranking infantrymen, who stood up for this country during the War of Liberation and who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for their homeland wore headcovers and will always wear headcovers. The mothers of those soldiers gave them the resolution to run to their deaths with a smile on their lips to defend their homeland by breastfeeding them under their headcovers as white as their untainted milk.

That headcover is as radiant and sacred as the luminous whiteness of the crescent and the star on our auspicious flag.

That headcover is as sacred as the ammunition our heroic grandmothers carried on their backs and protected with their headcovers from rain during the War of Liberation.

It is hard to understand the sense behind the mentality of judging a person from her outer appearance and labeling her "the proponent of a certain regime." Which of our turbaned young girls and women have been found to take part in an illegal act or organization inimical to our state and nation to warrant such judgement? Moreover, even if an ignorant traitor happens to wear a headcover, that does not justify the verdict that all persons wearing headcovers are adherents of the same ideology. This is simply one of the intrigues staged by circles which have failed to subdue our nation by all the means they have tried and which do not want to see it develop itself and to reclaim the values which have made it great.

Civilization and progress cannot be achieved by fitting people into molds; they can only be achieved by sensing and understanding it spiritually and mentally. The turbaned Turkish woman must be able to teach in schools, examine patients in hospitals and serve in every area needed by her nation while wearing her headcover.

Article 24 of the Constitution grants all citizens the right of "freedom of religion and conscience." No individual has the right to impose his faith on any other individual. Similarly, no individual has the right to require others to endorse his way of life and behavior. This rule is also one of the fundamental principles of Islam which explicitly requires the wearing of the headcover that is so frightening to some: "There can be no coercion in religion."

Just as a turbaned young girl cannot force anyone else to cover her head, no one can pressure a turbaned woman to uncover her head and thus restrict her freedom.

Every "responsible citizen" who appreciates freedom of thought, which is an essential part of civilization, must not oppose the headcover. Otherwise, no matter how much he insists that "he is a Muslim," no matter how many "pashas he lists in his ancestry" and no matter who he is this great nation will pass the verdict he deserves.

[Signed] Nermin Utku, Kadikoy, Istanbul

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COMMENTARY ON LACK OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 8 Jan 87 p 2

["Window" column by Ilhan Selcuk: "Shame and Crime"]

[Text] Sometimes a person begins daydreaming on the bus, in the taxi or on the train and misses his stop. Then he looks outside and jumps from his seat in panic:

"Oh, my goodness!"

And the remedy?

There is no remedy other than taking another vehicle and going back.

Our present situation is like that. Ataturk's reforms and the 27 May Constitution have taken most of us further than where we wanted to get off, and now we think that using the multiparty system to turn back is democracy.

If this were not the case, would the "turban controversy" be considered a problem of democracy?

What is democracy?

An article in the January 1987 edition of GUN, a monthly journal of political news and commentary, may elucidate us on this issue. Correspondents Ahmet Erol and Sefa Gursoy interview Olle Soderman, the president of the Swedish civil servants' union. While reading the interview, I underlined some of Soderman's remarks.

The Swedish unionist says:

"Union activities in Sweden enjoyed a major growth in the late 1800's. These activities were particularly widespread among the workers. The civil servants first organized themselves in 1848. Up till the 1890's only the postal workers had organized. Union rights were earned slowly through persistent struggle. In the late 1890's, employers were firing unionized workers and exerted intense pressure on unionized workers. However, unionization was not illegal."

The unionization movement is a current issue in our country; in Western democracies it is a page from history.

Soderman continues:

"Initially, civil servants unionized only in narrow professional branches. In the 1900's several local trade unions were formed. First there were associations and then unions. Civil servants in central government offices unionized in 1904. As a result, the Swedish Employers' Association (now Union) was forced to recognize the Confederation of Worker Unions, the central organization of the workers, in 1906. Of course, that did not mean that all union problems were solved. For example, in 1909 there were general strikes and lockouts across the country. The unionization of civil servants continued slowly but systematically paralleling these developments. In 1910, women switchboard operators and women office workers formed their own unions in the telephone administration. The men also had their professional organizations. Because under the conditions of the time this was the most natural way to organize. In time, conditions were created to form federations and confederations."

As is seen, in Sweden's democracy women civil servants formed their own union in as early as 1910 to defend their rights. In our country, there is no civil servants' union even today; our girls are fighting for the "freedom of the turban" to cover their hair.

As recounted by the Swedish unionist in GUN, Swedish civil servants won the right to sign collective labor agreements in 1937 and the right to strike in 1966. In Sweden, they have labor unions for policemen, military officers, civilian employees of the armed forces and even judges and prosecutors.

In Sweden all civil servants are unionized.

Soderman says:

"In our times, not being organized is virtually shameful."

For them not being organized is "shameful"; in our country being organized is a "crime."

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